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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the financial crisis, the movement advocating for a financial transaction 
tax gained considerable support, culminating in the presentation of a proposal for such a tax 
by the European Commission on September 28, 2011. This thesis researches and analyzes the 
use of a financial transaction tax in light of the stated purpose of the Commission’s proposal. 
The primary goals of the tax are to (1) raise revenue, (2) curb excessive volatility, and (3) har-
monize the internal market. Taxes are most commonly implemented for their revenue-raising 
qualities rather than as tools for remedying market distortions. In contrast, many view the 
primary function of the financial transaction tax as a regulatory tool to minimize excessive risk 
taking in financial markets. Although this thesis will analyze the potential effects on revenue 
and the tax’s ability to contribute to harmonization of the internal market, the primary focus 
is on the volatility-reducing effect regulatory authorities can expect from implementing such a 
tax.  
Although the thesis will use the European Commission proposal for a financial trans-
action tax as its starting point, it will also review other variations on the financial transaction 
tax. The thesis will also present alternative measures that should be considered for achieving 
the goals set forth by the European Commission in lieu of, or in addition to, a financial trans-
action tax, and evaluate these measures in light of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
financial transaction tax. The thesis concludes that while a financial transaction, in theory, 
may seem like a dynamic solution that could accomplish several different goals, a multifaceted 
approach tailored to each individual issue is likely to create a more strategic solution in the 
long run. A more narrowly tailored strategy is also less likely to negatively affect GDP and trad-
ing patterns than a financial transaction tax.  
 3 
PREFACE 
 The motivating factor in my choice to write about the financial transaction tax is that 
the theory of taxation straddles the boundaries between law and finance. Having recently 
completed a degree in law, I wanted a topic where I could research both the legal and econom-
ic implications of a hypothesis. My choice of topic, however, has not proven unproblematic. 
The concept of a financial transaction tax is currently subject to a lot of attention, and there 
have been many new developments to account for during the four months of writing. Most 
significantly, the European Commission proposal changed significantly halfway through the 
process. Instead of a proposal presented before the entire European Union for a vote, a few 
countries chose to proceed using the enhanced cooperation framework provided for by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the European Union Constitution. I have, to the best of my 
ability, tried to incorporate these changes into the thesis, but because the enhanced coopera-
tion proposal is not yet available the thesis had to proceed using the Commission proposal. 
However, this likely makes very little practical difference since the enhanced cooperation 
countries will probably use the Commission proposal as a basis for their framework. Moreo-
ver, due to the specificity of the proposal, the thesis at times deviates from the Commission 
framework, and instead analyzes the broader concept of the financial transaction tax. The 
most significant limitation of this thesis is the small focus on empirical analyses. Instead, the 
thesis analyses the notion of a financial transaction tax on a more conceptual, theoretical level. 
The rationale supporting the stronger focus on the theoretical side is that taxes have a broader 
effect than most other regulatory measures. Moreover, because the financial transaction tax 
has yet to be implemented, obtaining data to support or oppose its implementation is difficult. 
Overall, the thesis concludes that due to the distortive effects of the tax, and in particular, its 
effect on company financing, the financial transaction tax should not be implemented. Rather, 
the European Union should develop a broader scheme of regulation, which more precisely 
targets the various causes of the financial crisis.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the recent global financial crisis, governments have started looking 
for new ways to raise revenue and reverse the trend of rising government debt. In the United 
States alone, the federal government spent more than 12.1 trillion dollars to bail out strug-
gling companies after the financial crisis (New York Times, 2011). In comparison, the United 
States faced a federal budget deficit of 1.4 trillion dollars for the 2009 fiscal year (Fox News, 
2009). During this period public sentiment against the financial sector grew stronger, and 
many believed that the banks were unfairly prioritized over private individuals and small busi-
nesses, despite playing an imperative role in creating the financial crisis. Similar scenarios took 
place outside the United States, and the European Union member states contributed more 
than 4.6 trillion euros to the financial sector, which equals 39 percent of EU-wide Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) in 2009 (Sadakova, 2012). Following the crisis, public debt in the EU 
states rose from around 60 percent of GDP in 2007 to 80 percent in 2010 (Eurostat, 2011). 
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to see why the concept of a tax targeted toward 
the financial industry has gained traction in the public eye, especially because the financial 
sector was a significant cause of the crisis in the first place. One governmental response to the 
financial collapse was the move toward a financial transaction tax. On September 28, 2011, 
the European Commission presented a proposal to institute a financial transaction tax within 
the European Union. The tax would take effect in 2014 and would impose a 0.1 percent tax 
on equities and debt securities and 0.01 percent tax on derivative transactions involving a Eu-
ropean Union financial institution. Although the prospects for implementation are dim due 
to UK opposition to the tax, the proposal has given new wind to the movement favoring a tax 
targeted at the financial sector.  
 The term “financial transaction tax” is a generic term that encompasses several types of 
financial taxes. Most prominent among the various financial transaction taxes are the securi-
ties transaction tax and currency transaction tax. In addition, other financial taxes are often 
offered as alternatives to a transaction tax, including the bank balance sheet tax and the finan-
cial activities tax. The focus of this thesis will be on a securities transaction tax, in particular a 
tax on equities, bonds, and derivatives as set forth in the Commission proposal. The motiva-
tion for introducing a financial transaction tax is two-fold. First, authorities need to increase 
revenue to counteract the increasing national budget deficit and to avoid a debt crisis. The tax 
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may also on some level penalize the financial sector, and make the financial sector contribute a 
fair share to the economy. Second, the tax discourages financial market speculation by raising 
the costs of financial trading, and thereby reducing the probability of a new crisis of the same 
magnitude. Although the two motivations are distinct, they do not operate in a vacuum from 
one another, and commentators have with greater frequency questioned the role of the finan-
cial sector, the dire economic consequences that resulted from inadequate risk management in 
the industry, and the large government expenditures that have been necessary to remedy the 
wide-reaching effects.  
This thesis applies fundamental theories on tax policy and financial markets to deter-
mine the likely consequences of implementing a tax on financial transactions. Both propo-
nents and opponents have raised many arguments in favor and against the proposal. This the-
sis will further develop some of the concerns that have been raised by critics of the tax, and 
analyze whether alternative structures to the Commission proposal can mitigate the negative 
effects of a financial transaction tax. Pragmatically, the thesis will use the recent European 
Commission proposal as a starting point, but will also review other financial taxes in place or 
under consideration in various countries. Thus, the substantive analysis portion of this will 
thesis will proceed based on the stated goals of the European Commission. First, the thesis 
will review the revenue-raising abilities of the tax. The financial transaction tax’s capacity to 
raise fiscal revenue is undisputed; however, there is possibility that the undesirable conse-
quences from imposing the tax will overshadow the revenue raising quality of the tax. In fact, 
some even go as far as claiming that because the tax will negatively affect GDP through a re-
duction in investment in trading, any revenues created by the tax will be more than offset by 
the loss in GDP. Second, this thesis will assess whether a financial transaction tax is a proper 
tool for curbing volatility in financial markets, or whether more aptly suited methods should 
be considered instead. Although the tax seeks to minimize market volatility by making short-
term speculative trading more expensive, it is unlikely to truly remedy harmful volatility that 
exists in the market. Essentially, the tax is not a suitable solution because it only targets one 
possible source of volatility—speculative trading. Indeed, during the recent financial crisis it 
became clear that speculative trading was not the sole cause of the crises, but other issues also 
contributed to the crisis, including excessive leverage and misaligned invectives. The structure 
of the financial tax would not remedy these sources of volatility. Moreover, the financial trans-
action tax will likely lead to unintended and undesirable consequences in financial markets. 
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Most prominently, the tax will increase the cost of capital, which will make it more expensive 
for companies to finance real economic activity. Furthermore, the tax will reduce trading, 
which in turn will impede market liquidity. This is problematic because market liquidity plays 
a critical role in price discovery. Consequently, the financial transaction tax may in fact exac-
erbate volatility stemming from errors in market prices because the tax would make it more 
costly for market participants to restore prices to their fundamental values. Moreover, the tax 
will likely reduce the capital base of financial institutions at a time where the economic crisis 
has led to increasingly stringent regulations on capital requirements. Although the proposal 
attempts to prevent disruptions to company financing through the exclusion of primary mar-
kets, the tax will still affect the company financing through its effect on the secondary markets. 
Lastly, the tax will harmonize financial taxes within the internal market because the proposal 
would require the member states to repeal financial taxes currently in place, and instead, im-
pose a minimum transaction tax in accordance with the proposal.  
The thesis will also analyze other alternative proposals, including the financial activities 
tax, that could be alternative regulatory measures in lieu of the financial transaction tax. The 
thesis also makes a final recommendation regarding the Commission proposal. The final rec-
ommendation that this thesis advocates for is to develop alternative regulatory structures to 
address the issue of excess volatility. Although a more comprehensive regulatory scheme will 
not by itself raise revenue for the EU countries, the Commission can consider other taxes for 
accomplishing this goal, such as the financial activities tax. The financial activities tax may also 
have some of the same effects of the financial transaction tax, but causes less of the negative 
externalities. Overall, choosing a more multi-faceted approach would minimize the distortions 
that would result from implementing a financial transaction tax.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 What Is a Financial Transaction Tax?  
A financial transaction tax is a monetary charge placed on transactions in the financial 
sector. Although the concept by itself is straightforward, its application is anything but simple. 
First, the applicable “transaction” must be defined, that is, the authority imposing the tax 
must specify which types of transactions should be subject to the tax and which ones should 
not. This includes a determination as to which instruments should be covered by the tax. Se-
cond, taxing authorities must decide on the proper timing for imposing the tax. One of the 
most valuable concessions that taxpayers receive is the ability to defer the payment of taxes to a 
later date. Due to the time value of money, when a tax is due at an earlier time, the relative 
burden borne by the taxpayer is higher than if the time for payment is later. As a result, the 
perceived burden of the tax may vary based on the timing of the payment of the tax.  
 Although the financial transaction tax has received a significant amount of attention 
lately, transaction-based taxes are not a new concept. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes proposed 
a levy on Wall Street transactions to curb excessive speculation that, in his view, caused excess 
volatility in financial markets. The goal of Keynes’ tax was to restore the balance between 
speculators and long-term investors, and to prevent long-term investments and enterprises 
from “becom[ing] the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation”1 (Keynes, 1936). He stated:  
“When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of 
the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of 
success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the 
proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profita-
ble channels in terms of future yield cannot be claimed as one of the 
outstanding triumphs of laissez faire capitalism . . . .”  
Moreover, in 1972, Nobel Prize winning economist James Tobin suggested a levy to reduce 
volatility in currency exchange rates. The charge, which later came to be known as the “Tobin 
tax,” consisted of a percentage-based tax levied on the volume of spot conversions of currency 
(Tobin, 1972). Tobin suggested each government carry the responsibility for implementing 
                                                
1. Keynes’s comment in full provides: “Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But 
the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (Keynes, 1936). 
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and administering the tax, with the effect that each country would tax all currency exchanges 
within its borders, regardless of the type of currency involved. Tobin’s proposal suggested that 
the tax would be levied when the transaction occurred, as opposed to when the cash flow took 
place, and therefore transactions would be subject to the tax even if the parties later voided the 
transaction. This structure would prevent speculators from entering into a transaction merely 
to influence or manipulate exchange rates. The proposal was eventually abandoned due to the 
perceived difficulties of implementation, and because of the concern that a tax on currency 
transactions would undermine the liquidity in exchange markets, and thereby exacerbate vola-
tility problems. The notion of a tax on currency transactions gained additional traction follow-
ing the Peso and East-Asian crises in the late 1990s, wherein policymakers became aware of the 
high exposure domestic economies had to external events in the international monetary mar-
kets. In Mexico, high exposure to the U.S. dollar, combined with the government printing a 
large amount of new money caused excessive pressure on the Peso, which led to its eventual 
devaluation in December 1994 (Whitt, 1996). After the Peso collapse, several economists re-
searched ways in which the crisis could have been avoided. Most prominently, the German 
economist Paul Bernd Spahn proposed a currency transaction tax in 1995 to curb extreme 
volatility in the currency market (Spahn, 1995). Although the proposal was based on Tobin’s 
theories, Spahn (1995) reasoned that the Tobin tax, in its proposed form, was infeasible stat-
ing that “it is virtually impossible to distinguish between normal liquidity trading and specula-
tive ‘noise’ trading.” Instead, Spahn suggested a two-tier rate structure with a low-rate currency 
transaction tax, and an exchange surcharge at prohibitive rates. A modern advocate for a tax 
on all financial transactions is Nobel laureate and former Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz. While Tobin drew the conclusion that a global currency transaction tax 
was infeasible in practice, Stiglitz thought that with the advent of modern technology, this was 
no longer the situation (Conway, 2009). Stiglitz argues that regulatory failure and the lack of 
proper alignment of incentives in the financial sector warrants imposing a financial transac-
tion tax to remedy these problems (Stiglitz, 2009). These are just a few of the prominent econ-
omists that have favored a financial transaction tax, and many more have expressed support 
for the tax, including Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, and Paul Volcker.  
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2.2 Recent Developments 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments around the world, as well as vari-
ous international organizations, have considered the financial transaction tax as a tool to cre-
ate more equitable distribution of government funds. Today, forty countries impose financial 
transaction taxes, and ten of those countries are members of the European Union (Griffith-
Jones & Persaud, 2012). Table 3 of the Appendix provides a short summary of some of the 
financial transaction taxes that are currently in place. Moreover, many countries have had 
proposals pending to introduce various types of financial transaction taxes, including France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The details of these proposals are 
summarized in Table 2 of the Appendix and discussed in Part 2.3. Moreover, following the 
financial crisis, an extensive movement began to implement a so-called “Robin Hood Tax” in 
the United Kingdom. This proposal has generally received wide support and extensive media 
coverage.  
One of the first discussions concerning the feasibility of a global financial transaction 
tax was conducted during the Group of 20 Heads of State (G20) meetings. The initial discus-
sions took place at the 2009 Pittsburgh meeting, where the finance ministers of the world’s 
leading economies addressed methods for stabilizing the economy (G20, 2009). At this meet-
ing, the G20 asked the IMF to research various options for taxing and repaying some of the 
government expenditures made during the financial crisis (International Monetary Fund, 
2010). The results of this report were presented at the 2010 Toronto meeting, but the mem-
bers would not engage in more detailed discussions until the next meeting. At the 2011 Paris 
meetings, the G20 finance ministers discussed the need to stabilize the financial sector, to 
implement reforms on over-the-counter instruments, and strengthening supervision of the 
sector. The participants also debated options for innovative financing, as well as the prospects 
for a financial tax. At the subsequent G20 meeting, held in Cannes, France in November 
2011, the leaders made little progress with respect to the potential of a financial transaction 
tax, and simply noted that such a tax had been implemented several places. However, at a sub-
sequent meeting in Paris, the G20 explicitly stated that a global tax on financial transactions 
was no longer being considered. Instead, the G20 encouraged individual countries to imple-
ment such a levy on a national level. In the aftermath of this meeting, several countries began 
 12 
to research the feasibility of implementing a tax on financial institutions as suggested by the 
G20.  
In 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), upon request by the G20, issued a 
report titled A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector, for the purpose of 
“prepar[ing] a report . . . with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are 
considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution to-
ward paying for any burden associated with government interventions to repair the banking 
system” (International Monetary Fund, 2010). The driving motivation behind the G20 request 
were the significant contributions made by various governments to financial institutions dur-
ing and in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The IMF (2011) estimated that fiscal contribu-
tions during the crisis averaged around 3 percent of GDP for G20 countries, and reached al-
most twice this level in the most severely affected economies. Moreover, the report found that 
the total amounts pledged, including guarantees and other contingent liabilities, averaged ap-
proximately 25 percent of GDP. The report concludes that the perceived more favorable 
treatment of the financial sector stems from two primary causes. First, the report argues that 
economic distortions exist due to the more advantageous tax treatment of loan capital, and 
that the tax deductibility of interest payments leads to significant reliance on debt as opposed 
to equity. Indirectly, this leads to an outcome where ordinary consumers subsidize corporate 
investment through cheaper loan capital. To solve this problem, the report suggests reducing 
taxes on equity capital to incentivize corporations to lower the debt–equity ratio, which subse-
quently would contribute to stabilizing the economy since equity financing takes less of a toll 
on financial institutions. Second, and more importantly, the report addresses the idea of a 
global financial tax. The tax analyzes two different tax structures: a transaction-based tax and 
an activities-based tax. Instead of a tax levied on each financial transaction, the report ulti-
mately advocates for a tax levied on the profits of financial institutions, so-called “Financial 
Activities Tax.” This type of tax was also proposed by the Norwegian Financial Crisis Commis-
sion (Finanskriseutvalget, 2011).  
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2.3 Financial Taxes Around the World 
2.3.1 The United States 
U.S. legislators have implemented a variation of a financial transaction tax, through 
which the financial sector funds its own regulatory agency, the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). The tax is levied on the volume of transactions traded on U.S. exchanges, and 
is authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 31 (“Section 31 fees”). The size of the 
Section 31 fee is 0.00257 percent—raised from 0.0017 percent in 2010—and it raises nearly $1 
billion annually (Griffith Jones & Persaud, 2012). However, the SEC is not unique in impos-
ing this type of tax, in fact, many clearinghouses impose fees similar to that levied by the SEC, 
including the Automated Clearing House. Interestingly, this tax is levied even though the U.S. 
government has clearly expressed its opposition to a global financial transaction tax. Moreover, 
the Section 31 fees have been lowered and raised multiple times since its implementation in 
1934 without creating any significant debate (SEC, 2011). This shows that the opposition to 
the tax may be premised on a misapprehension of how the tax would work in practice. It must 
be assumed that if U.S. legislators truly opposed a financial transaction tax, they would not 
have passed the amendments to Section 31. Admittedly, many of these amendments came 
about before the financial sector reached its current prominent position in the economy, and 
many legislators may now feel more strongly about protecting the financial industry, but this 
nevertheless lends some credence to the fact that the United States could potentially agree to a 
global financial tax.  
In addition to the Section 31 fees, U.S. legislators have presented two prominent pro-
posals for a tax on the financial sector: the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee and the Let 
Wall Street Pay for the Restoration of Main Street. On January 14, 2010, President Obama 
presented the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee. The Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee tar-
gets high debt-to-equity ratios, and its stated purpose is to make “the largest and most highly 
levered Wall Street firms . . . pay back taxpayers for the extraordinary assistance provided so 
that the TARP program does not add to the deficit” (White House Press Release, 2010). The 
proposal would assess a 0.15 percent levy on liabilities of financial firm with assets exceeding 
50 billion dollars. The outline of the proposal ties the fee directly to the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), enacted to aid with recovery during the financial crisis. The enabling statute 
of TARP specifically provides that the funds are subject to repayment at a later date. Accord-
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ingly, the stated goal of the fee is to raise at least 117 billion dollars over a ten-year period, 
which equals the projected cost of TARP. Moreover, in December 2009, U.S. Representative 
Peter DeFazio, co-sponsored by twenty-five other representatives, introduced the bill “Let Wall 
Street Pay for the Restoration of Main Street Act of 20092” (H.R. 4191) in the House of Rep-
resentatives. Although ten bills for a financial transaction tax had previously been introduced 
in the House of Representatives, and four in the Senate, this bill is by far the one to receive 
the most attention. The proposal provides for a 0.25 percent levy on the value of equity trans-
actions and a 0.02 percent tax on covered transactions involving futures, swaps, credit default 
swaps, and options. However, the bill exempts any securities held by pension funds or mutual 
funds, and any transaction conducted by taxpayers who incur less than one hundred thousand 
dollars in transaction value in a year. The proceeds of the tax would be used “to fund job crea-
tion and deficit reduction” (H.R. 4191). The bill estimates that the tax will raise close to 150 
billion dollars annually, and 75 billion dollars of this amount would be targeted toward deficit 
reduction. However, because the bill did not pass prior to expiration of the congressional ses-
sion, the bill was cleared from the books (Govtrack.us). In November 2011, Representative 
DeFazio introduced a similar act, “The Wall Street Trading and Speculators Act” (H.R. 3313). 
But contrary to its predecessor, the bill defines the tax base more broadly, and changes the levy 
to 0.03 percent uniformly applied to all financial instruments. Moreover, the new bill does not 
include the exemption for mutual and pension funds, or traders amassing less than one hun-
dred thousand dollars in transaction value over the course of a year. Currently, this bill, along 
with the companion bill introduced in the Senate, is pending before Congress. However, due 
to the stark opposition to financial transaction taxes in the U.S. financial industry, it is unlike-
ly that either bill will pass. 
2.3.2 The United Kingdom 
In 1694, the English Parliament introduced a fixed amount stamp tax on transactions 
in various goods for the purpose of “carrying on the war against France” (Stamp Act, 1891). In 
the beginning, the tax was not levied on financial instruments but started as a tax on “Vellum, 
Parchment and Paper for 4 years . . . .” (Ibid.). The stamp duty was not expanded to financial 
instruments, including transfers of shares, until 1808, at which time, the tax was changed to 
                                                
2.  This Bill was later reintroduced under the name Let Wall Street Pay for Wall Street’s Bailout Act of 2009. 
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an ad valorem tax (HM Revenue and Customs, 2001). A companion tax—the Stamp Duty Re-
serve Tax—a stamp duty on financial transactions was introduced as a part of the Finance Act 
of 1986, and exists in addition to the original stamp tax (Finance Act, 1986). The stamp duty 
imposes a 0.5 percent levy on the value of a conveyance of uncertificated shares of companies 
located in the United Kingdom, however, a higher amount of 1.5 percent is charged if the 
purchaser of the shares is a person who operates a depositary receipt or a clearance service. 
Moreover, the Finance Act excludes qualifying intermediaries such as market makers in large 
financial institutions form the scope of the tax. Currently, the Stamp Duty Reserve Tax and 
the Stamp Tax are imposed in the same size (0.5 percent), and in certain circumstances, a 
transaction may trigger liability under both taxes, but the charge under the Stamp Duty Re-
serve Tax may be cancelled at a later time to avoid double taxation. The tax is primarily col-
lected automatically by various stock market participants, including brokers, at the time the 
transaction takes place. One significant feature is that most of the revenues from the Stamp 
Duty Reserve Tax is raised from non-UK investors. In fact, in 2008 of the 3,673 billion euros 
raised by the Reserve Tax, nearly 40 percent of those revenues came from outside the United 
Kingdom (Staff of the European Commission, 2011). Although the scope of the Stamp Duty 
was significantly limited by amendment in 2003—the tax currently only applies to around 30 
percent of transactions—the two taxes combined still contribute upwards of 1 percent of total 
tax revenue for the United Kingdom (Spratt, 2006). Notably, the United Kingdom is not 
alone in imposing a stamp duty tax, and similar taxes have also been present in Singapore, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and many other countries.3 Unlike the outstanding proposal for 
a financial transaction tax in Europe, it seems as though the primary function of the stamp 
duties in the United Kingdom has been to raise revenue. Nevertheless, the centuries-long his-
tory of the stamp duty aptly demonstrates that there is a long history of imposing not only 
transaction-based taxes, but also those specifically levied on financial instruments. As such, the 
strong opposition by the United Kingdom toward the European financial transaction tax may 
be strongly exaggerated. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom introduced a bank levy in January 2011. This tax is lev-
ied on the end-of-the-year balance sheet position of financial institutions, as opposed to on 
                                                
3.  Markedly, some countries also impose stamp duties on original issuances on equity.  
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each transaction as the financial transaction tax proposal suggests. The basis for assessing the 
balance sheet consists of a number of factors to determine the amount of risk-weighted liabili-
ties that a bank owns, and the purpose is to impose a greater tax on risky activities. Because 
many have suggested this type of tax instead of a financial transaction tax, this tax will be dis-
cussed in more detail later on. 
2.3.3 France 
France was one of the early advocates for a financial transaction tax, and together with 
Germany, launched the initial idea of a European proposal for the tax on August 16, 2011. 
Following the introduction of the proposal in the European Commission, French lawmakers 
presented draft legislation before the French Parliament. The draft legislation, known as “Taxe 
systémique sur les banques,” was narrower than the EU proposal, and would apply a tax of 0.1 
percent only to equity securities issued by a company listed in France with a size of at least 1 
billion euros. Additionally, the proposal would apply a tax to high frequency trading, that is, 
speculative, high volume trading, of 0.01 percent, and a 0.01 percent tax on credit default 
swaps on EU sovereign bonds. The French legislature hoped that the tax could generate up-
wards 1 billion euros, and would contribute to reducing the budget deficit. The proposal be-
came effective on January 1, 2011.  
2.3.4 Germany 
The German proposal resembles the French proposal in many ways, which comes as no 
surprise since the French lawmakers explicitly stated that they would draw inspiration from 
the German proposal. Like the French proposal, the German proposed “Bankenabgabe” took 
effect on January 1, 2011. The financial transaction tax applies to all credit institutions and 
would apply progressive rates on various liabilities. For liabilities under 10 billion euros, the 
rate would be 0.02 percent, and for liabilities exceeding 100 billion euros, the tax would be 
0.04 percent. Moreover, the tax would apply a 0.00015 percent tax on any off balance sheet 
derivatives.  
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3. THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE 
3.1 Background 
The failure of the G20 discussions at the Pittsburgh and Toronto meetings was a cata-
lytic force behind the European Union’s decision to pursue a financial transaction tax. On 
September 28, 2011, the President of the European Commission, Jose Barroso, launched an 
official plan to implement a financial transaction tax in the European Union. The proposal 
would become effective on January 1, 2014, and the Commission estimates that the tax could 
raise close to 57 billion euros annually. Indeed, in its long-term budget from 2014 to 2020, the 
European Commission included a financial transaction tax as part of the funding of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU Budget 2014–2020). The Commission states its motivations as: (1) to en-
sure that the financial sector contributes to the cost of the financial crisis; (2) to harmonize 
taxes on financial transactions in the European Union; (3) to discourage risky trading activities 
and implement regulatory measures for the purpose of avoiding future crises; and (4) to pro-
vide an additional source of income for the European Union (Commission Proposal, 2011).  
The legislative basis for the European Union to impose taxes on the financial sector 
stems from Articles 113 and 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Article 113 permits the European Council, acting unanimously, to “adopt provisions for the 
harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indi-
rect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment 
and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition” (TFEU, 
2008, art. 113). Article 115 echoes this sentiment, but with broader application, and provides 
“the Council shall, acting unanimously . . . issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establish-
ment or functioning of the internal market.” This provision guarantees “the four freedoms” of 
the European Union—the free movement of capital, goods, services, and people. Consequent-
ly, the main justification for European Union intervention is that the functioning of the in-
ternal market would be impeded if member states fail to coordinate taxes on the financial sec-
tor. Currently, ten European Union member states impose financial transaction taxes, and 
more member states have active legislative proposals to introduce such taxes. The lack of coor-
dination for these taxes fragments the internal market, and may distort competition and in-
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crease the risks of relocation of financial activities outside the European Union. Moreover, a 
related risk is that an unconcerted effort would make European companies more prone to 
double taxation (Staff of the European Commission, 2011). 
 For the proposal to become legislation the member states must unanimously vote in 
favor of the proposal, which essentially renders any dissenting vote a veto. Currently, seven 
countries have expressed their support for the proposal, while five countries, including the 
United Kingdom, oppose the proposal. The primary criticism that underlies the opposition is 
the fact that the proposed tax only applies to the European Union, and many argue that so 
long as the tax is not introduced globally, the tax will harm the competitiveness of the coun-
tries that implement the tax. The proposal states that it intends “to pave the way towards a 
coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners.” However, the likelihood 
of a global financial transaction tax is low, especially because the United States, one of the 
most prominent members of the G20, opposes the tax. Owing in large part to the British op-
position to the Financial Transaction Tax Directive, it became clear during the Commission 
meeting on June 28–29, 2012 that there would not be unanimous support for the proposal. 
Nonetheless, the proposal had garnered strong support within the European Union and the 
governing commission, and therefore it seemed unlikely that supporters would abandon the 
proposal completely. Moreover, the financial transaction tax commanded wide support among 
the general population. Opinion polls showed that nearly 65 percent of residents of European 
Union countries support a financial transaction tax (European Commission Memo, 2011).  
Because of the dim prospects for the proposal, many member states began to consider 
alternative methods of implementation. One such strategy is to establish the tax within an area 
of “enhanced cooperation.” European law provides that, in the absence of support by all 
member states, a minimum of nine member states may apply to the European Commission to 
introduce legislation, and allow other countries to join later (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999). 
Initially, some suggested that the tax only be implemented as an enhanced cooperation within 
the euro-zone, which would eliminate any concerns from non-euro countries such as the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Sweden. However, on September 28, 2012, eleven member states, including 
France and Germany, requested that the European Commission allow these countries to im-
plement the tax as a part of the enhanced cooperation framework (Boston, 2012). In a joint 
statement the German and French finance ministers stated “[b]y taking this joint step and 
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making the application, Germany and France state the necessity of European integration on 
the issue of taxation of financial markets with an eye toward alleviating the consequences of 
the financial crisis” (Ibid.). The Austrian Deputy Finance Minister, Andreas Schieder, echoed 
this sentiment: “This is a small step for 11 countries but a giant leap for Europe . . . [t]he way 
is now clear for a just contribution from the banking and financial sector for financing the 
burdens of the crisis” (O, Donnell & Papachristou, 2012). According to the Austrian Finance 
Minister, the eleven countries intend to present a model for the tax by the end of the year, and 
expect to implement the tax by 2014 (Ibid.). One point of contention that has yet to be re-
solved by the parties to the enhanced cooperation is how the income from the tax should be 
spent. Moreover, proceeding with enhanced cooperation may cause additional issues. First, the 
European Council must consent to the enhanced cooperation prior to implementation. Alt-
hough all member states may participate in the discussions and vote on the authorization to 
proceed, only the members of the enhanced cooperation group may vote on the implementa-
tion itself. Essentially, the enhanced cooperation framework provides the sole basis for pro-
ceeding with the proposal as a multinational group. Granted, the countries may choose to 
implement the tax on a national basis, but this does not carry the same force or signal effect as 
a joint implementation would. Many of the countries that currently oppose the proposal may 
contest the enhanced cooperation initiative. Even if the tax is only implemented in a small 
area, the proposal will still affect the opposing member states because other European coun-
tries are among their primary trading partners. At the same time, the opposing countries 
would not receive any of the revenue. Consequently, the enhanced cooperation solution could 
face significant issues in the authorization process.  
3.2 Scope  
The primary characteristic of the proposed financial transaction tax is the broadness of 
the proposal. The design of the proposal specifically aims to eliminate any weaknesses com-
monly associated with a financial transaction tax. There are three important facets to the scope 
of the tax: (1) the parties to the transactions must be subject to the tax, (2) the traded asset 
must be subject to the tax, and (3) the transaction must occur within the geographic scope of 
the tax. As mentioned previously, the tax would apply to any transaction in financial instru-
ment where at least one party is a resident of a country within the European Union. As a re-
sult, the tax covers a broad range of financial instruments, including those exchanged over-the-
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counter (OTC) outside organized markets. This model has been dubbed the “residence plus 
issuance model,” and the focus on location of the parties rather than the transaction itself 
could render any financial transaction conducted anywhere in the world subject to the tax. 
The purpose of the residence plus issuance model is to close loopholes that allow tax avoid-
ance. By covering a wide range of products, financial institutions will not be able to use alter-
native financial products that may substitute instruments subject to the tax.  
Moreover, the European Commission has defined the scope of the tax broadly to hin-
der tax avoidance. The tax is levied on all transactions involving spot and derivative assets, 
whether traded on organized exchanges or over the counter. The tax would apply to financial 
transactions carried out by financial institutions, and the institution must be a party to the 
transaction on its own account, a party to the transaction for the account of another person, 
or acting in the name of a party to the transaction. The definition of “financial institution” is 
broadly drafted to encompass a wide range of institutions, including investment firms, credit 
institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, undertakings for collective investments in 
transferable securities, alternative investment funds, and special purpose entities (Commission 
Proposal, 2011, art. 2.1(7)). If one of the parties is a financial institution and the other party is 
a natural person or a nonfinancial institution, and either party is established in a member 
state, then only the financial institution is subject to the tax in the member state where either 
party is established. Conversely, the proposal excludes some transactions from its scope. The 
exclusions can be divided into two types: exclusions of a party and exclusion of the transaction 
altogether. The first category covers certain financial market intermediaries, such as central 
securities depositories and the European Financial Stability Facility or similar funds estab-
lished by two or more member states to support members in financial difficulties. The second 
category applies to the European Bank, central banks of member states, and other interna-
tional organizations. Moreover, currency transactions in spot markets would not be subject to 
the tax. Additionally, activities relating to citizens or businesses would not be affected by the 
tax, including insurance contracts, mortgage lending, consumer credit, and payment services. 
Conversely, the proposal would not apply to primary issuances of shares and bonds. Notably, 
intra-group transfers are still subject to the tax, and the Directive specifically provides that 
“[transfers] of the right to dispose of a financial instrument as owner any equivalent operation 
implying the transfer of the risk associated with the financial instrument” are subject to the tax 
(Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 2.1(1)(b)). This means that it will be more difficult to try to 
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avoid the tax by conducting a financial transaction through a subsidiary located outside the 
European Union, and then transferring the security internally within the company.    
Moreover, to fall within the scope of the financial transaction tax, at least one party to 
the transaction must be established in a member state. A financial institution is deemed estab-
lished in a member state if it has been authorized by a member state or if it has its registered 
seat, permanent address, usual residence, or a branch in a member state if the transaction is 
carried out by that branch, or the member state where the counterparty to the financial trans-
action is established (Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 3.1). If both parties are financial insti-
tutions but only one is a financial institution established in a member state, both parties to the 
transaction are subject to the tax. A non-financial institution is established within a member 
state if it has its registered seat or a branch in that member state if the transaction is carried 
out by that branch. However, even if the transaction falls within the scope of the tax under the 
previous analysis, the transaction may nevertheless be excluded if the taxpayer can prove that 
“there is no link between the economic substance of the transaction and the territory of any 
Member State” (Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 3.3). Although it is unclear exactly what 
“economic substance” means, it probably includes factors such as location of assets and the 
location of financial activities of the institution. Alternatively, one can look to the “economic 
substance doctrine” as defined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States. The 
IRS defines “economic substance” as a transaction which changes the taxpayer’s economic 
position in a meaningful way and which has a substantial purpose, other than tax effects (IRC, 
§ 7701(o)).  
For the size of the tax, the proposal applies a dual system where shares and bonds are 
taxed at a rate of 0.1 percent and derivatives at 0.01 percent. However, this amount is just a 
minimum, and each member state is free to set a rate higher than those proscribed in the pro-
posal so long as the member state does not discriminate in its application of the tax. The im-
portant point for reaching the Commission goal of reducing excess volatility is that the ideal 
size of the tax is where only high frequency trading becomes more expensive due to the tax. In 
that case, the tax will not significantly alter the behavior of those market participants that are 
deemed to conduct desirable market activities. The tax burden is divided between the buyer 
and the seller, and each party to the transaction must pay their share of the tax to the member 
state where the party is domiciled. The tax base is the value of the underlying asset being trad-
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ed, and in the case of bonds and derivatives their notional value. If the transaction is not con-
ducted at arm’s length, for example a transaction between two related entities, and occurs at a 
value below market, the tax base will be the market value at the time of the transaction. In a 
report conducted by the European Commission, researchers estimated that the tax could in-
crease revenue by 57 billion euros annually. However, this result will likely vary significantly 
based on even small changes in the tax.  
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX ON THE 
EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMY 
4.1 Rationales for a Financial Transaction Tax 
The rationales underlying the Commission proposal are multi-faceted. One major ra-
tionale behind the Commission’s proposal is harmonization of taxes and regulatory regimes 
within the European Union. In a press release accompanying the proposal, the Commission 
stated that the proposal would “help to reduce competitive distortions in the single market, 
discourage risky trading activities and complement regulatory measures aimed at avoiding fu-
ture crises” (European Commission Press Release, 2011). Another goal for the Commission is 
to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair contribution to the economy. This second mo-
tivation is best regarded as the Commission’s way to soothe public outrage following severe 
economic crises in many European countries. The financial sector received significant contri-
butions from European governments, which contributed, in part, to the economic problems 
caused by excessive public debt. According to the IMF, government debt in G20 countries is 
projected to rise by nearly 40 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2015 (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2011). The tax would generate substantial revenue that could contribute to reduc-
ing budget deficit and reducing public debt. Moreover, the financial sector has benefited from 
a lower taxation level worth around 18 billion euros annually due to exemption for financial 
services from Value Added Tax (VAT) (European Commission Technical Fiche, 2011). The 
financial transaction tax would be a substantial step toward leveling the scale of government 
assistance, and eliminating the favorable treatment afforded to the financial sector. Addition-
ally, the Commission hopes that the tax will curb speculative trading by increasing transaction 
costs, which in turn would stabilize financial markets and reduce volatility. Most of the nega-
tive reactions relate to the concern that the proposal will likely be detrimental to the financial 
sector by increasing the cost of capital and impeding market liquidity. Additionally, many ar-
gue that the tax fails to target the true causes of market instability, and the factors that most 
significantly contributed to the financial crisis. This section will analyze in more detail the 
rationales underlying the Commission proposal as well as some of the criticisms that have 
been raised in opposition to the proposal.  
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4.2 Increasing Revenue and Securing a Fair Contribution from the Financial Sector 
4.2.1 Raising Revenue 
 The foremost goal for most taxes is to increase revenues for the taxing authority. A tax 
that levies a cost on one party should provide revenues to the party levying the tax, most 
commonly, the government. This holds especially true in light of the economic downturn and 
the large budget deficits looming in many EU countries. As a result of the current fiscal crisis 
many governments have sought alternative revenue-raising measures. The benefit of a financial 
transaction tax is that it would be targeted toward a specific part of the economy—a sector 
which incidentally received an overwhelming majority of the bailout funds that contributed to 
the deficit in many countries. Moreover, there is a general consensus that the payment capacity 
of large financial institutions is high, and thus, a tax on these transactions will have a relatively 
less detrimental effect on the economy. Yet, because of the sheer size of the financial sector, 
even a small tax would create large revenues. Several scholars advocate for the revenue-raising 
effects of a financial transaction tax, and Feige (2001) even controversially suggested that a 
transaction tax—the Automated Payment Tax—replace all existing sources of tax revenue. The 
Commission proposal focuses on the revenue-raising objective in three different ways. First, 
the proposal seeks to secure that the financial sector contributes to the costs of the recent fi-
nancial crisis. Second, the proposal wants to create a level playing field with other sectors from 
a taxation point of view. Third, and most significantly, the proposal aims to create additional 
revenue for the European Union and reduce national contributions from the member states. 
However, using the financial transaction tax as a means to achieve this latter goal is not un-
problematic. In particular, the Commission proposal fails to adequately account for the nega-
tive effect on GDP from changes in tax policy. To properly evaluate the revenue-raising poten-
tial of a proposed tax policy, legislators need to balance the revenue raised by the tax with the 
reduction in GDP. Admittedly, it is difficult to estimate the economic effect of a new tax with 
precision. The tax may influence the way transactions are made, the parties involved in the 
transaction, as well as the amount of transactions. These effects may be positive or negative 
depending on whether the changes are made to desirable or undesirable activities.  
In the seminal case McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States John Marshall described the critical role of taxes to the economy, observing 
that “[t]he power to tax involves the power to destroy.” Although the European Commission 
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has estimated that the tax would raise about 57 billion euros a year from its intended imple-
mentation date of 2014, it is uncertain whether the additional revenue raised from the tax will 
be more than offset by the negative effect it would have on the financial sector. The primary 
negative effect of the financial transaction tax is a reduced number of transactions in the fi-
nancial sector. Moreover, by increasing the cost of financial trading activities, the tax will en-
courage a shift in investment away from the financial sector to other areas of the economy. 
Other concerns relate to the negative consequences to volume and liquidity, and the projected 
flight of several businesses to outside the European Union. Notably, due to the difficulties of 
assessing the future loss of GDP, revenue estimates for financial transaction taxes are not nec-
essarily reliable. When Sweden implemented a financial transaction tax in 1984, the annual 
revenue the tax was expected to raise was SEK 1.5 billion, but the actual revenues raised 
turned out to be only around SEK 80 million.  
Because taxes reduce the marginal payoff to the taxpayer, almost all taxes have negative 
effect on production due to the elasticity of taxable income. This effect is illustrated by the so-
called “Laffer curve,” named after its creator Arthur Laffer, which represents the relationship 
between tax rates and the corresponding level of government revenue (Wanniski, 1978). The 
European Commission estimates a long run loss in GDP of 0.53 percent as a result of the tax 
(Staff of European Commission, 2011, p. 10). But the staff report also conducts an alternative 
analysis by altering the assumption for funding investments by increasing the relative debt 
share. This altered assumption resulted in a change in GDP of negative 0.2 percent, because 
the tax primarily affects the equity component of the investment. However, Griffith-Jones and 
Persaud (2012) argue that the Commission report overlooks several key factors, and when ac-
counting for these factors, the authors instead estimate a positive 0.25 percent effect on GDP 
as a result of the introduction of a financial transaction tax. To estimate the effect on GDP, 
the Commission used a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model whereby the Com-
mission simulates the effect of the tax by increasing the corporate income tax. This model, 
however, has several disadvantages. Most importantly, this approach explicitly assumes that the 
financial sector is similar to other corporate sectors and ignores different holding period ap-
plied by various investors. The first of these assumptions is flawed because a corporate income 
tax is fundamentally different from a transaction tax. Traditionally, the corporate income tax 
is viewed as the most distorting of all taxes. In the current economic environment where Eu-
ropean countries are struggling and investors are shying away from the financial sector due to 
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a lack of confidence, investment in equity assets, derivatives, and other financial instruments 
subject to the tax will likely drop. Instead, investors will tend to opt for more stable, long-term 
investments. As a result, the corporate income tax is more likely to reflect the effect of a finan-
cial transaction tax under normal economic prosperity, but not in recessionary times. Addi-
tionally, Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) emphasize that if the tax was fiscally neutral, that is, 
if the financial transaction tax merely replaces another tax, the tax could have a positive effect 
on consumption because the shift in taxation structure would lower overall taxation of con-
sumers, thereby allowing them to consume more. This is premised on the fact that consumers, 
generally, have a higher propensity to consume extra income than other, wealthier, groups, 
and this increase in consumption would contribute to an increase in GDP. Another shortcom-
ing with the Commission’s model is that is assumes that all private investment is financed by 
securities that are traded in equity markets, and that the traders pay the tax to the government. 
Lendvai, Raciborski, and Vogel (2012) offer a revised model that assumes that only part of 
private investment is financed by equity raised in the stock market, and the remainder is fi-
nanced by debt or retained profits. Under this assumption, the negative effect on GDP was 
relatively smaller (-0.2 percent) than under the first assumption. This is because a financial 
transaction tax will not affect debt or investments funded by retained earnings. Even though 
the revenues may be difficult to estimate under the current scenario, it is also important to 
note that even minor changes in the tax will have large effects on the revenues raised. For ex-
ample, if the tax was applied equally on all financial instruments, the tax would raise revenue 
by between 16.4 billion and 43.4 billion euros annually if the flat percentage level was set to 
0.01 percent. Alternatively, if the percentage tax was 0.1 percent, the revenue increase would 
be between 73.3 and 433.9 billion euros. As a result, the tax will undoubtedly have negative 
effects on GDP, however, most likely this reduction in GDP will be more than offset by the 
revenue the tax will create. Consequently, the elasticity effect of the tax would not be large 
enough to push the tax over to the wrong side of the Laffer curve, and the Commission could 
probably increase the rates even more and still gain a net positive effect from the tax. Never-
theless, because of these distortive effects, it is not certain that the financial transaction tax is 
the best suited method for raising revenue.  
 Conversely, if the financial transaction tax contributes to reducing systemic risk, and 
consequently the likelihood of future crises, the cost benefit to society will likely be great. In 
recent years, the risk of financial crises has grown even higher, and furthermore, the cost of 
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handling economic crises has increased tenfold. Reinhart (2009) estimated a 9 percent fall in 
GDP as a result of major financial crises. Similarly, The Institute of Fiscal Studies (2011) 
found that the projected decline in median household income in the United Kingdom from 
2010 to 2013 is 7.4 percent. Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) estimates that if the financial 
transaction tax could decrease the probability of a crisis by 5 percent, with a corresponding 
cost of reduction in GDP due to a crisis is 7 percent, the tax would effectively increase GDP by 
0.35 percent. Therefore, the impact of a lower risk of financial crises would further contribute 
to the revenue-raising ability of the financial transaction tax. Moreover, the fact that the costs 
of financial crises are increasing, makes it even more important to stabilize market conditions 
to prevent future crises. Obviously, a lower risk of financial crises is likely to correspondingly 
reduce the likelihood and frequency of booms. Nevertheless, booms tend to have less of a 
long-term positive effect on the economy than the negative effect of a crisis, and therefore, the 
reduced probability of booms is not very problematic.  
4.2.2 Redistribution of Tax Burden Levied on the Financial Sector 
 One of the fundamental characteristics of sound tax policy is that taxes should be 
fair. This is an important consideration underlying the financial transaction tax, and many 
believe that the tax will be an important tool to “make the financial sector pay its fair share.” 
One of the most vocal campaigns for a global financial transaction tax goes by the name of 
“the Robin Hood Tax Campaign.” Like the classic tale itself—wherein Robin Hood and his 
group of outlaws would famously steal from the rich and give to the poor—supporters of 
this campaign envision themselves as a modern-day version of the celebrated outlaw by 
redistributing wealth from profitable financial companies to the general public. Authorities 
increasingly recognize the penalty function of taxes. Many are calling for penalties for the fi-
nancial sector, which basically single-handedly caused the recent financial crisis due to excess 
risk taking and the trillions of dollars paid in bailout funds.  
One perspective of fairness is that taxpayers should be taxed in accordance with their 
ability to pay. The ability-to-pay principle states that tax burdens should be allocated in accord-
ance with a taxpayer’s wealth. The rationale for this principle is the declining marginal utility 
of income, that is, relatively poorer taxpayers tend to consume more of their extra income 
than relatively wealthier taxpayers. In turn, this will contribute to growing the economy. For 
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the financial transaction tax, this principle holds true because financial institutions are gener-
ally profitable corporations with a large asset base. A related principle of fairness is the level-
playing-field principle, which seeks to create equal opportunities for all taxpayers. This is rele-
vant for the financial transaction tax to the extent it creates equal ability for companies, both 
financial institutions and non-financial institutions, to attract investment. If the financial in-
dustry is under-taxed relative to other industries, investment in the financial industry should 
yield higher returns, which will make it easier to attract investments and capital. Consequent-
ly, the financial transaction tax would create a more level playing field by reducing profits in 
the financial sector.  
Imposing a tax targeting the financial industry is perceived as fair, and overdue, by 
many. This industry has long been viewed as being relatively under-taxed compared to compa-
nies that produce goods and services. Part of the explanation for the relative under-taxing 
compared to other industries is that many financial services are exempt from VAT. Conse-
quently, a common argument is often made that a further tax on the financial sector is re-
quired to avoid distortions of capital distribution in favor of the financial sector. The VAT 
exemption stems from Article 135.1 and extends to most financial and insurance services 
(VAT Directive, 2006). The primary purpose of the VAT exemption is to reduce the tax bur-
den on services offered to consumers. However, some argue that the redistributive effects and 
tax advantage of the VAT exemption have yet to be proven conclusively. In fact, the Staff of 
the European Commission (2011) notes in its Impact Assessment of the financial transaction tax 
that the tax advantage stemming form the VAT exemption is in the range of 0.017 and 0.11 
percent of GDP. Nonetheless, the authors of the report caution that the estimates are “rough” 
and should be interpreted carefully. The Commission further states that “[the VAT exemp-
tion] results in a preferential treatment of the financial sector compared with other sectors of 
the economy as well as in distortions of prices” (Staff of the European Commission, 2011). 
But even if empirical analyses could demonstrate under-taxation of the financial sector, this 
does not necessarily mean that the financial transaction tax is the proper method of correcting 
this distortion. First, the primary motivation behind the exemption is to protect banks that 
receive deposits and providing credit, and therefore the rationale is to benefit consumers. 
Moreover, the financial transaction tax as suggested by the European Commission specifically 
excludes transactions involving consumers from its scope. Instead, many suggest that a finan-
cial activities tax, which this thesis will address in more detail later, is the preferred method for 
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replicating the effect of a VAT on financial services. Second, the more intuitive solution to the 
distorted distributions is simply to end the exemption. Instead of imposing a new tax, which 
could cause additional distortions, authorities could take advantage of an already existing tax, 
which eviscerates much of the administrative concern, including legislative actions to create a 
new tax and costs of administrations.  
 However, one inherent risk of many taxes with a penal purpose is that the effect of the 
tax will not reach its intended target. For the tax to possess the redistributive effect and to 
make the financial sector repay some of the funds it received, the tax should be narrowly tai-
lored to impact the financial sector. Many have expressed this concern as it relates to a finan-
cial transaction tax, and a common fear is that the financial sector may simply shift the effect 
of the tax onto consumers, or, alternatively, the tax may in practice directly tax consumers by 
taxing large financial institutions such as retirement funds. Similarly, the tax could also dis-
proportionally affect charitable trusts, money market funds, and other non-financial business-
es. Matti Leppälä, the Secretary General of the European Federation for Retirement, noted the 
need to design the tax narrowly to avoid such unintended and counterproductive consequenc-
es: “A tax that tries to shoot at everything that moves will most likely not hit the intended tar-
get, but it will kill or wound many innocent bystanders . . . this new tax would disproportion-
ately impact pension funds and other institutions which provide retirement income.” The idea 
that the majority of the cost of the tax would be borne by pensioners is the primary reason why 
the Netherlands initially opposed such a tax. A survey conducted by the Dutch Central Bank 
estimates that a European Union financial transaction tax would cost Dutch financial institu-
tions 4 billion euros annually, and 42 percent of this amount would fall on pension funds 
(Van Gaal, 2012). Nevertheless, the premise underlying the Dutch Central Bank study is ques-
tionable. Although the financial transaction tax will clearly create costs for pension funds, this 
burden will fall substantially less on pension funds as compared to other financial institutions. 
Because pension funds are typically long-term investors, they will also less frequently engage in 
financial trading. In fact, in an article published in the Financial Times, John Plender (2011) 
argues that a financial transaction tax may actually benefit pension funds because high fre-
quency traders deprive long-term investors of profit in the market. Buckley and North (2012) 
support this argument and note “[a] tax levied against the value of the underlying asset places 
most of the burden on traders with a short time horizon rather than on pension funds. Many 
institutional pension and mutual funds aim to limit the turnover of their portfolios.” Pension 
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funds hold a stock on average for two years. Under the European Commission tax scheme, a 
pension fund that turns over 50 percent of its equity portfolio would pay 0.05 percent tax on 
the total value of the transactions over the two years. On the other hand, a speculator often 
turns over the entire portfolio in a day, and would pay a tax of 50 percent per year. Buckley 
and North (2012) note that if the financial transaction tax leads to a 5 percent reduction in 
the risk of financial crashes, the pension funds would be financially neutral toward the tax, 
provided that the reduction in financial crises led to higher long-term profit. Moreover, the 
reduced risk for financial turmoil will also decrease the need for risk-reducing measures such 
as hedging. This will further reduce the cost of engaging in trading for pension funds. Conse-
quently, although some of the cost of the financial transaction tax will fall on pension funds, 
this burden will be, at least in part, be countered by the positive consequences of eliminating 
destabilizing speculative trading.  
Moreover, Buckley and North (2012) express a related concern and note that “[a] large 
part of the tax burden may well be passed on to the users of financial services in the form of 
reduced return to savings, higher costs of borrowing and/or increases in final commodity pric-
es.” Because the European Commission proposal specifically exempts consumer transactions 
from its scope, this argument essentially assumes that financial institutions will pass the cost of 
the tax onto the consumers. Although private investment in financial instruments will be af-
fected, most private investors infrequently turn over their portfolios and will therefore not 
likely be significantly impacted by the tax. Nevertheless, if the financial institutions are able to 
pass the cost of the tax onto consumers, the financial transaction tax could potentially have 
large effects on consumers through decreasing rates on deposits or increasing the costs of 
loans. This could also influence the savings rate for consumers since the return on savings 
would decline. This effect, however, has not been studied in much detail. 
Similarly, the desire to use the financial transaction tax to penalize the financial sector is 
further problematic because not all players in the financial industry are alike. First of all, banks 
in only a few countries primarily contributed to the financial crisis, and as a result, it is unrea-
sonable to impose penalties on all financial institutions. One example of this is Canada where 
the banks remained stable and well capitalized (Atlantic Council & Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
Furthermore, there is no certainty that the financial institutions themselves will carry the bur-
den of the tax. Moreover, many of the worst offenders have since exited the market, including 
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Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Therefore, using the financial transaction tax as a penalty 
may be a double-edged sword, which ends up hurting financial institutions that acted respon-
sible prior to the financial crisis or consumers when financial institutions pass the tax onto 
them.   
4.2.3 Implicit State Guarantee 
The objective of raising revenue may also be justified on the ground that certain finan-
cial institutions enjoy an implicit state guarantee. A moral hazard problem exists because gov-
ernments implicitly guarantee financial institutions through government bailout arrange-
ments. Moral hazard means that financial institutions tend to take greater risk than they 
would otherwise take because they know that they enjoy implicit protection through the 
bailout guarantee, and therefore will not suffer the entire downside loss. Because the failure of 
large financial institutions may lead to system-wide contagion, governments view the implicit 
state guarantee as a better outcome than letting a financial institution fail, which could poten-
tially create wide-ranging economic consequences. Through the implicit state guarantee, these 
financial institutions will also enjoy a lower cost of capital because investors will require lower 
returns due to elimination of large portion of the downside risk. The financial transaction tax 
would be one option for the financial industry to pay for the implicit guarantee provided by 
the government. But similar to the issues with imposing a penalty on the sector as a whole, 
participants in the financial industry will perceive making an entire industry pay for a guaran-
tee that only a few institutions benefit from as unfair. In response, however, one could argue 
that the financial transaction tax would be akin to an insurance policy. That is, financial insti-
tutions would pay the tax today for the possibility of receiving a bailout in the future. There-
fore, it is less relevant which institutions have received bailout funds in the past, because it is 
not possible to predict which institutions will receive such funds in the future.  
Although, many governments are currently trying to reduce the scope of the guarantee 
to make the threat of failure more credible, the programs will certainly remain in some scope. 
During the recent financial crisis, the U.S. government refused to rescue Lehman Brothers 
from bankruptcy—an act viewed by many as setting a new precedent for state guarantees. On 
the other hand, the U.S. government chose to intervene to help other institutions, including 
mortgage institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The different strategies used by the U.S. 
government in these cases may very well lend credibility to the threat of withdrawing the state 
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guarantee, which in turn will reduce the risk of moral hazard. Vella, Fuest, and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2011) mention the Vickers proposal in the United Kingdom, which aims to ring-
fence and limit the extent of losses for capital by reducing the funds available for bailouts. 
However, the fact that the UK Banking Act of 2009 expressly deals with bailouts, further rein-
forces the expectation that government bailouts will always be a factor in the financial indus-
try. Consequently, it seems unlikely that government bailout programs will decline anytime 
soon, and therefore the financial transaction tax may be an effective tool to recapture some of 
these expenditures.  
4.2.4 Reduction in National Contributions 
If the financial transaction tax is passed, the funds from the tax could is scheduled to 
reduce the individual contributions from each member state to the EU budget. The EU budg-
et is used for administrative expenditures and to fund policies carried out at the European 
level. The net contribution from each member state varies over time, and there is no fast and 
steady formula to calculate these contributions. However, the contributions are a function of 
three different components: a fixed percentage of gross national income, customs duties col-
lected on behalf of the European Union, and a percentage of VAT income (European Com-
mission, 2012.). The European Union argues that the financial transaction tax will significantly 
reduce the national contributions, and estimates a total reduction of 54 billion euros by 2020 
(European Commission Press Release, 2012). In its 2014–2020 budget, the European Com-
mission specifically included the financial transaction tax as an individual source of financing, 
and the Commission stated that by implementing the tax, “[the financial transaction tax is a] 
possible candidate[ ] for own resources to gradually displace national contributions, leaving a 
lesser burden on national treasuries” (Ibid.). It is questionable, however, whether the distribu-
tive characteristics of the tax are in line with those intended by the European Union. Due to 
the structure of the tax, the countries with significant financial centers will collect relatively 
more tax than those countries with less prominent financial sectors. Although this distribution 
scheme is more likely to ensure that the countries that suffer the most financial hardship from 
the tax, it also requires that the European Union reevaluates its future revenue plans to ac-
count for the higher revenues received by these countries due to the European financial trans-
action tax.  
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In the proposal, the Commission suggests that two-thirds of the revenues from the tax 
go into the general budget for the European Union, and this amount would directly reduce 
the contribution from gross national income. The last third would be retained by each mem-
ber state (European Commission Press Release, 2012). The reduction in national contribution 
is based on projections of the revenue from the financial transaction tax. In 2010, the Europe-
an Commission estimated revenue from the financial transaction tax based on that year’s data 
would be 57 billion euros. By 2020, this total would rise to 81 billion euros, of which, 54.2 
billion euros would be used to fund the EU budget. In a similar vein, the European Union 
estimates that the national contributions based on gross national income in 2020 would be 
110 billion euros. Consequently, the reduction in national contributions would be nearly 50 
percent. The estimated reductions in national contributions are illustrated in the table below, 
and are included in the European Commission Press Release (2012).  
Reduction in National Contributions by 2020 for EU Member States  
Total €54226 (in millions) 
Belgium €1.588 Greece €896 Luxembourg €154 Romania €634 
Bulgaria €176 Spain €4741 Hungary €423 Slovenia €166 
Czech 
Republic 
€658 France €8768 Malta €27 Slovakia €338 
Denmark €1.026 Italy €6457 Netherlands €2634 Finland €834 
Germany €10.753 Cyprus €80 Austria €1248 Sweden €1664 
Estonia €67 Latvia €81 Poland €1813 
United 
Kingdom 
€7692 
Ireland €534 Lithuania €131 Portugal €645   
Table 1. Source: European Commission Press Release, 2012.  
Based on this table, it is evident that a successful implementation of the financial transaction 
tax could potentially reduce the national contributions from each member state. The reduc-
tion in contributions would be proportionally related to the tax amount raised by each coun-
try. A reduction in national contributions could positively impact the national economy of 
each country because this would free up funds that were initially targeted toward national con-
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tributions. Instead, the freed-up funds could be used to reduce national debt, or for other pub-
lic finance purposes. Conceivably, this effect could be replicated by instead implementing taxa-
tion on a national level, rather than by the European Union centrally, however, by levying the 
tax on the EU level, the Commission would have more control the use of the funds for na-
tional contributions compared to a unique resource. Consequently, the European Union 
could reduce the national contributions in solid economic conditions and use the funds as an 
individual resource when the European Union requires additional funding.  
4.3 Curbing Excess Volatility and Combatting Pervasive “Short-Termism” in Markets 
In general, taxes are collected for one of two non-exclusive purposes: to collect revenues 
and to discourage activities that have undesirable effect on the market. Taxes that are intended 
to discourage certain activities by internalizing negative externalities are commonly referred to 
as “Pigou taxes” or “sin taxes.” Prominent examples of sin taxes are taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, 
and gasoline. The purpose of these taxes is to increase the cost of engaging in the undesirable 
behavior. One of the key goals of the European Commission is to reduce speculation that 
leads to undesirably high volatility. In light of the recent financial crisis, where excess risk tak-
ing nearly brought national economies to the ground, governments are desperately trying to 
find ways to align the incentives of the financial sector with those of the economy at large. 
Although the financial transaction tax cannot be described as a pure “sin tax” because the 
purpose for introducing the tax is multifaceted, the tax certainly possesses a sin tax compo-
nent. By levying the tax on financial institutions, legislators seek to minimize risk taking, and 
in particular high frequency trading, by making financial transactions more expensive. Howev-
er, sin taxes are usually imposed on activities that are universally perceived as negative, whereas 
market participants still disagree whether high frequency trading is solely negative.  
A dual effect of a tax is its ability to either induce distortions, or in the alternative, cor-
rect a market failure. The direct consequence of a tax is to change the price or cost of a good 
or service, and thereby altering the equilibrium of that good. For the financial sector, it is even 
more important to take into account efficiency factors because the relatively smaller costs will 
lead to larger effects in the market equilibrium. Consequently, this also presents an opportuni-
ty to correct current market failure if there are inefficiencies. In fact, Keynes’s proposal of a 
financial transaction tax was largely based on a motivation to correct mispricing in securities 
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markets. Various empirical studies suggest that a financial transaction tax may lower the price 
of the asset subject to speculation, yet these studies do not draw any conclusions as to whether 
the tax would affect volatility. This raises the question: Will a financial transaction tax limit 
the probability, or scope, of future financial crises? And relatedly, could such a tax have 
changed the fate of the economy over the last few years?  
4.3.1 A Primer on Market History 
When James Tobin presented his proposal for a transaction tax on currency exchanges, 
the intent was to put “sand in the wheels of finance” to reduce speculative activities in foreign 
exchange markets to curb volatility in those markets (Eichengreen, Tobin & Wyplosz 1995, p. 
163). Summers and Summers (1989, p. 263) early argued in favor of a financial transaction tax 
due to concerns about “excess volatility caused by destabilizing speculation” and the move-
ment of human and capital resources from socially productive activities to the financial indus-
try. The authors reasoned, “[s]uch a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability 
introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the 
economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers” (Ibid.). The attack on the fi-
nancial services industry is not only a reaction to the financial crisis, but also an attempt to 
highlight which role the industry should play in the economy. Many commentators argue that 
the current size of the industry is both unsustainable and too large for its optimal social func-
tion. Lord Turner, Chairman of the Financial Services Agency in the United Kingdom, labels 
many of the activities in the financial services industry as “socially useless activity” (Monaghan, 
2009). The issue is the tipping point where the financial industry goes from producing and 
contributing to enhanced overall wealth to just being a tool for redistributing wealth among 
the actors in the industry.  
The global economy has changed profoundly over the last few decades due to the 
growth of globalization. Forty years ago, capital for goods and services far exceeded capital used 
for investment. Today, capital flows for investment outweigh trade flows by one hundred to 
one (Arner & Buckley, 2010). Levels of global market activity has grown rapidly over the last 
twenty years, and as a result, the ratio of financial transactions to GDP in 2007 was more than 
75.3, in contrast, the same ratio was 15.3 in 1990 (Ibid.). Matheson (2011) notes that the de-
cline in transaction costs over the last thirty-five years is the primary cause of the higher in-
crease in financial activity as compared to other types of economic activity. He further argues 
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that the primary increase has been for short-term trading, and especially in derivative markets 
because transaction costs in these markets are lower than for spot markets. The level of finan-
cial integration across markets is constantly increasing—a scenario, which increases the flow of 
information and contributes to efficient price setting, but also creates dependency between 
markets through their inherent interconnectedness. Moreover, the nature of investment has 
also changed dramatically over the last twenty years or so, and trading has become much more 
dependent on technology. Furthermore, large institutional investors have grown to promi-
nence, and assets managed by U.S. mutual funds more than quadrupled in the 1990s (Buckley 
& North, 2012). Similarly, with the advent of more information, investors are also maintain-
ing a shorter perspective, and often require companies to deliver staggering returns over short 
time periods. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as “short-termism.” The short-term 
focus and extreme expectations for high returns led financial market participants to take even 
greater risks, and began using high leverage and complex derivatives to satisfy investor expecta-
tions of exorbitant returns. In 2007, 88 percent of the total volume of transactions was deriva-
tive based (Darvas & Weisäcker, 2010). During this time period, high frequency trading also 
became more common. High frequency trading generally refers to computer-based trading that 
generates a large number of orders at quick speeds. These traders mostly use algorithms to 
analyze market conditions to determine which orders to execute. Correspondingly, algorithmic 
or computer-driven trading contributed nearly 60 percent of the U.S. equity trading, and 30–
40 percent of European and Japanese equity trading in 2009. The volume of computer-driven 
trading was almost 40 percent of futures trading, 10–20 percent of currency trading, and 20 
percent of options trading in the United States (New York Times, 2012). Algorithmic trading 
is often associated with high frequency trading, which is often blamed for rapid changes in the 
price of various financial instruments. The purpose of high frequency trading is to use the 
speed of computers to take advantage of minor pricing errors in the market. Illustrative for 
this purpose is the fact that Goldman Sachs chose to move the location of its computers closer 
to NASDAQ because, according to the company’s calculations, each millisecond gained could 
add more than one hundred million dollars of profit (Williams, 2008). One common strategy 
of high frequency trading is to generative a large volume of orders over a short time period, 
and then later cancel these transactions. Some estimates of the magnitude of high frequency 
trading suggest that high frequency trading constitute between 50 and 75 percent of all trans-
actions (Buckley & North, 2012). Hedge funds, in large part, contribute to this statistic. These 
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changes in investment and trading patterns has caused the focus of investors to shift from 
fundamental valuation considerations to trying to identify even the smallest pricing discrepan-
cies so that they can take advantage of these market errors. Additionally, these traders often 
bet against market trends, which may further skew market conditions away from fundamental 
values. At the same time, the trend of liberalized financial markets and less government regula-
tion has had a significant impact on market stability. Today, financial crises are occurring with 
higher frequency, while at the same time the average costs of financial crises have increased 
dramatically. Therefore, excess volatility has a much larger impact on the economy than in 
earlier times. 
4.3.2 Will the Financial Transaction Tax Help Reduce Volatility?  
 Although the risk of high frequency trading may be significant, the financial transac-
tion tax may not be the ideal tool for controlling that risk. In its proposal for a financial trans-
action tax, the European Commission repeatedly emphasized the hazards of short-term trading 
and its detrimental impact on market stability. However, speculators were not the sole cause of 
the recent financial crisis, but rather other factors contributed to destabilization as well, in-
cluding pervasive misallocation of risk in the market, misaligned incentives in financial institu-
tions, and excess debt–equity ratios. This section of the thesis will review in detail each of the 
possible causes of the financial crisis and determine whether the financial transaction tax 
would remedy these sources of volatility.  
4.3.2.1 Impact on Speculation and High Frequency Trading 
To curb future financial crises, or the effects thereof, it is important to reduce specula-
tion. Speculation is harmful to market stability because speculators may artificially drive up 
prices in the market, which will alter the information available to other investors in the mar-
ket. Proponents of the tax argue that by making short-term trading more costly as compared to 
more long-term trading, speculative activities would become less profitable, which in turn 
would reduce volatility from high frequency trading. Keynes (1936) argued that the pursuit of 
short-term profits is essentially a zero-sum game for society, and should therefore be discour-
aged. Notably, high frequency trading and speculation is the foremost target of the European 
Commission’s proposal for a financial transaction tax. In 2010, the staff of the European 
Commission researched and published a report on the prospect of implementing a financial 
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transaction tax in the European Union. The report noted that “[e]ssentially, the debate on 
financial transaction taxes boils down to the question of the influence of transaction costs on 
trade volume and price volatility, and whether they can serve as a corrective device to reduce 
the number of allegedly harmful short-term traders” (Staff of the European Commission, 
2010). Interestingly, the report rejected the premise that the tax would reduce high frequency 
trading and link financial market activity more closely to fundamental market information 
(European Commission, 2012). Notably, the report also questioned the oft-cited assumption 
that short-term trading is purely negative. Another report, published by the International 
Monetary Fund, reaches similar conclusions. In essence, the IMF report argues that the finan-
cial transaction tax is not the proper tool for targeting financial market instability because it 
fails to address the fundamental factors that create volatility. This reinforces the concern that 
the financial transaction tax is the legislative equivalent of “firing a cannon at a sparrow.” It 
emphasizes that it is problematic to “distinguish ‘undesirable’ from ‘desirable’ short-term trad-
ing,” and that the tax would disadvantage non-speculators such as pension funds, and indirect-
ly, consumers. Despite the contrary conclusions of these two reports, there is reason to believe 
that the financial transaction tax could be well suited to address these challenges. In essence, 
the financial transaction tax makes it more costly to perform each individual transaction. 
Speculators try to gain from minor mispricing of assets by quickly identifying errors through 
the use of algorithms, then beating the market through ultrafast trading. Because the profit 
margin of each of these transactions is so small, engaging in this type of trading may no longer 
be profitable. The fact that speculators mostly target temporary misalignments, rather than 
reviewing fundamental information to determine long-run price developments creates a divide 
between speculative or noise trading, and more long-term, desirable trading. Moreover, the 
fundamental distinction between high frequency trading and long-term trading also allows the 
financial transaction tax to implicitly differentiate between these types of transactions. The tax 
could indirectly separate high frequency trading transactions from “normal” transactions if the 
level is set to render the first category unprofitable under the new tax scheme. Furthermore, 
the tax could have a desirable effect by dampening short-term sales. One dominant issue dur-
ing the financial crisis was the dumping of equity securities, especially bank shares, and the 
value of bank shares fell significantly over the course of the financial crisis. By imposing a tax 
on these transactions, the cost of dumping these shares would be higher, and therefore quick 
sales of equities would be less attractive. On the other hand, the tax could disproportionally 
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affect portfolios that invest in shorter-term, safe assets, compared to longer-term portfolios. For 
example, fixed income instruments commonly have shorter-term horizons, however, many 
fixed income assets are also considered to be very safe. Nevertheless, the financial transaction 
tax would discourage investment in these assets. However, overall, the financial transaction tax 
should be well suited to combat short-term price volatility stemming from high frequency trad-
ing and runs on securities.  
4.3.2.2 Volatility due to Misallocation of Risk 
Moreover, the initial trigger of the crisis was the collapse in the housing market, which 
in turn had a significant effect on the structured products tied to this market. Through the use 
of securitization, financial institutions pooled the risk of the underlying instruments, such as 
mortgages, and sold those products to investors. The Bank for International Settlements 
(2007) estimates that at its highest level in 2006, annual issue of credit derivatives constituted 
about 400 billion dollars per quarter, and the estimate of the nominal value of outstanding 
credit derivatives peaked at 58 trillion dollars at the end of December 2007. This securitization 
effectively separated the risk from the underlying investment, which created agency issues be-
tween the initial holder of the mortgage and its purchasers. Furthermore, these products were 
notoriously difficult to price correctly. Thus, the misallocation of risk was largely caused by 
distortions in the valuation of structured financial products, such as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs). Moreover, mispricing of risk was further en-
hanced by errors in risk rating. Nearly 60 percent of the structured products held an AAA-
rating (Fitch, 2007). In comparison, less than 1 percent of corporate bonds are given AAA-
ratings.  
In contrast to speculative activities, which may be discouraged by increasing transaction 
costs and where part of the problem is the volume of transactions, increasing transaction costs 
rarely cures misallocation of risk or valuation issues. Although a transaction tax would argua-
bly have some effect on the movement of these financial instruments between investors, these 
instruments are usually buy-to-hold securities not suitable for speculation. As such, a tax whose 
sole effect is to increase the cost of trading in the instrument would do little to remedy the risk 
of structured financial products. Consequently, while a financial transaction tax may be 
properly suited to combat short-term price volatility and price misalignment, the tax is not an 
apt tool for controlling long-term mispricing which may develop into a financial crash or bub-
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ble. 
4.3.2.3 Hedging and Other Risk-Reducing Measures 
Additionally, the tax may in fact increase volatility by reducing investment in risk-
reducing measures such as hedging because the tax would increase the cost of engaging in the-
se transactions. Moreover, the tax would penalize complex transactions more than simple 
ones. This is because a complex transaction will involve more individual transactions. Because 
the tax does not apply to a deal as a whole, more complex transactions will face a higher tax 
burden. McGowan, De Boynes, and Thomson (2012) illustrate this weakness the following 
way:  
[A] floating-to-fixed interest-rate swap hedging a floating-rate loan would 
be chargeable, where a simple fixed-rate loan would not. Hedging an 
equity derivative for a customer by buying the relevant equities would 
incur an additional charge. Synthesising one derivative by combining 
others would give rise to multiple charges. Underwriters of share issues 
would need to consider how the subscription arrangements should be 
structured. 
This feature of the financial transaction tax may be unfortunate because hedging transactions 
may be relatively complex. Consequently, the financial transaction tax may disincentivize 
hedging, which could result in lesser ability to manage risk by financial institutions. If compa-
nies spend a certain amount on risk management annually, those institutions may be reluctant 
to increase the overall budget due to the financial transaction tax. Therefore, if the cost of 
each hedging transaction increases, the institutions may engage in fewer individual transac-
tions, and therefore lessen the total risk coverage. The International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) expressed this concern for the proposal, and argued that the proposed tax 
would increase the costs for engaging in hedging and other risk-reducing measures (ISDA Press 
Release, 2011). The ISDA press release raises another important concern. Financial transac-
tions such as derivatives may have a very productive and desirable purpose. This relates to the 
problem of distinguishing speculative and unnecessary transactions, from productive and nec-
essary transactions. Most often, hedging transactions will fall into the latter category, but be-
cause speculators will use those same instruments to derive short-term profit, it would be ex-
tremely difficult to single out only the undesirable transaction for tax purposes. For example, a 
financial institution may use derivatives to reduce the risk of an investment. The risk-reducing 
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transactions may be entered into to offset undesirable commercial risks on regular transac-
tions, for example through the use of currency swaps or credit default swaps. Moreover, com-
panies may enter into derivatives contracts to hedge future costs, thereby making future ex-
penditures more predictable and less risky. This is common in the airline industry because 
airlines make significant expenditures on fuel, and the cost of fuel is directly tied to the cost of 
oil, which is often subject to large price swings. The increased cost would equal the cost of the 
financial transaction tax multiplied by the notional value of the asset to be hedged. Conse-
quently, if a company chooses to hedge 15 percent of its commodity costs, this would lead to 
an increase in cost of 0.0015 percent. Consequently, the financial transaction tax may have 
undesired effects that have nothing to do with the desire to reduce unnecessary risk taking by 
financial institutions, and it may actually increase the risk because the higher cost disincentiv-
izes companies from entering into such risk-reducing transactions.  
Admittedly, because hedging transactions are usually entered into on a longer-term ba-
sis than what high frequency traders do, the effect of the tax may not be as great as one would 
think. These costs may end up being negligible because a hedging entity is holding an asset, 
not trading it, and it is the latter behavior that is penalized by the Commission proposal. Also, 
because these types of transactions usually involve holding the instrument to maturity, the tax 
would be imposed only once, in contrast to most other instruments where investors realize 
gains or losses through the sale of a security. Nevertheless, the failure to address the disincen-
tives for hedging is a shortcoming of the proposal. However, the only practical option for ad-
dressing this shortcoming would be to exempt derivatives transactions altogether. The practical 
challenges of exempting just derivatives transactions entered into for hedging purposes would 
be immense. This would entail that the tax includes some type of mechanism for determining 
which transactions are entered into for hedging purposes and not—a classification system. An-
other way to remedy the increased costs of hedging as a result of the financial transaction tax 
could be to impose the tax in a fixed amount rather than on the notional value of the deriva-
tive instrument. Both these present logistical challenges, and it is unlikely that the Commis-
sion will amend the proposal to include any of these exemptions. Consequently, the effect on 
hedging will be a significant shortcoming of the proposal.  
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4.3.2.4 Increased Volatility due to Shift in Investment Patterns 
 Moreover, the tax may also implicitly increase volatility by encouraging a shift to in-
vestments in more risky derivatives. This effect is due to the more favorable rate of derivatives 
under the tax scheme. Under the Commission proposal, equities and bonds are taxed at a rate 
of 0.1 percent, while derivatives are taxed at 0.01 percent. Today, the level of substitutability 
between financial instruments is high. Substitutability refers to the ability to replace one fi-
nancial instrument with another, yet produce similar results. The risk from derivatives stems 
from multiple sources. First of all, these instruments are often complex, and can require ex-
tensive calculations to understand the proper valuation of the instruments. This prophecy 
came true during the recent crisis when mispricing of the risk associated with certain deriva-
tives such as CDOs and CDSs led to huge losses for many financial institutions. Second, many 
derivatives operate on an “all-or-nothing” basis, that is, if an investor bets that the underlying 
instrument will move in the wrong direction, that investor loses his entire investment. In con-
trast, an equity security or a bond will still retain some value despite an adverse price change. 
This creates high exposure risks for investors that transact in derivative instruments. Third, 
derivatives instruments are usually subject to less regulatory supervision, which creates more 
counterparty risk. Although most derivatives today are subject to some regulation and are of-
ten traded through central clearinghouses, many derivatives are still traded in the shadow of 
regulatory supervision. For derivatives that trade through central clearinghouses, the counter-
party risk is much smaller since the clearinghouse will facilitate collection and distribution of 
payments between the parties. For other derivatives, the parties would essentially just have a 
private contract that could only be enforced through the court system. Litigation is an expen-
sive, impractical, and lengthy process for resolving disputes, and the process is even more 
complicated if the two parties to the transaction are located in different countries. The risk of 
significant exposure to derivative instruments is illustrated in two particularly prominent col-
lapses: the Orange County bankruptcy in 1994 and the fall of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment in the late 1990s.4 Consequently, a move from equity and bond investments to deriva-
                                                
4. Orange County, California, famously suffered the largest municipal bankruptcy in the United States after a rogue 
treasurer borrowed fund to invest heavily in interest rate derivatives (Public Policy Institute of California, 1998). The treasurer 
believed that a long trend of the Federal Reserve raising interest rates must undergo an eventual reversal, however, the treas-
urer’s bet failed and the county was unable to service its debts and declared bankruptcy (Ibid.). Conversely, Long-Term Capital 
Management, a fund founded by Nobel winning economists Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, collapsed after the Russian 
government defaulted on its government bonds (Lowenstein, 2012).  
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tives may create higher risks for individual investors, and therefore, a collective move between 
these assets could create more systemic risk in financial markets. Moreover, as discussed previ-
ously, investment in derivatives may also increase because derivatives essentially provide a tool 
for tax avoidance. Contrary to company stock, there are no rules governing who may issue 
derivatives. Consequently, derivatives can be issued by anyone, in any jurisdiction. A derivative 
issued on the underlying share may therefore constitute a substitute to investment in the secu-
rity itself.  
4.3.2.5 Excessive Leverage and Agency Costs in Financing Decisions 
Another factor that contributed to the crisis was the high debt-to-equity ratios of finan-
cial institutions and excess leverage used to fund investments. The use of short-term financing 
was also a significant cause of the crisis. Financial institutions commonly use short-term fi-
nancing over longer-term loans because it is cheaper. However, this type of financing is also 
much risker than long-term loans. During the crisis, financial institutions would use short-
term financing, including interbank loans and commercial paper, to finance investments, but 
when the markets deteriorated and the value of assets fell, the financial institutions were una-
ble to service these loans as they became due. Moreover, when forced to continually refinance 
short-term loans, financial institutions were unable to obtain financing once the short-term 
credit markets dried up. The financial transaction tax could facilitate a reduction in reliance 
on short-term financing. The tax would make it more expensive to use short-term debt ar-
rangements because this would facilitate more frequent refinancing, which would result in 
more frequent exposure to the tax. Because short-term financing would become relatively 
more expensive, institutions would have an incentive to increase their portion of long-term 
debt. In turn, by reducing reliance on short-run financing, the financial institutions would 
have been better equipped to handle the crisis since they would not have fallen victims to the 
credit crunch and lack of available financing to the same extent.  
In contrast, the financial transaction tax is unlikely to have a positive impact on volatility 
stemming from high debt–equity ratios. Under the traditional Modigliani–Miller theorem 
(1958) regarding corporate structure, the value of a firm will not depend on the sources of 
financing, assuming that there are no agency, bankruptcy, or transaction cost, and markets are 
efficient. However, in practice, companies rely on debt financing because it is cheaper than 
equity, and that leverage carries with it a tax advantage due to the deductibility of interest 
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payments. The tax deductibility of interest payments creates a value for the company in the 
form of a tax shield, which equals the value of the debt times the corporate tax rate. The rea-
son why interest payments are generally exempted is because it is commonly viewed as a legit-
imate cost of doing business. However, in addition to the tax shield created by the deductibil-
ity of interest payment, companies also face bankruptcy costs as a result of using leverage to 
capitalize the company. Hence, the optimal capital structured of a company is where the mar-
ginal value of the tax shield equals the marginal value of increased bankruptcy cost as a result 
of an added unit of debt. The tax deductibility of interest payments creates risk because it in-
centivizes high leverage. In turn, high leverage ratios can limit the flexibility of financial insti-
tutions by causing liquidity constraints. Furthermore, high leverage also creates agency and 
moral hazard issues. Because equity owners will only bear part of the losses in case of a bank-
ruptcy, yet still just be limited to interest payments in case of large gains, financial institutions 
are incentivized to undertake risky investment in hopes of getting large payouts. This incentiv-
izes the use of debt because the residual equity owners will be able to shift part of the bank-
ruptcy cost over to the debt holders. While the financial transaction tax could discourage 
short-term financing by making short-term loans more expensive, it probably would only have 
a negligible effect on high debt–equity ratios. In contrast, a better approach for remedying 
distortions due to excessive leverage would be to make changes to the income tax, including 
removing or reducing the tax deductibility of interest payments. This would eliminate or de-
crease the value of the tax shield. Alternatively, regulators could increase capital adequacy re-
quirements. Similarly, regulators could implement stricter thin capitalization rules, which limit 
the deductibility of interest for corporations that have high debt–equity ratios. All of these 
options would be better suited to combat volatility derived from high leverage. 
4.3.2.6 Executive Compensation and Misaligned Incentives 
However, agency cost in financing decisions was not the only factor creating risk due to 
misalignment of incentives. Some argue that corporate governance problems, such as the 
structure of executive compensation and separation of ownership and control, were also to 
blame for the recession. For example, Bebchuk (2012) claims that the performance and risk 
choices of firms depend largely on the incentives of the firms’ executives. In the financial in-
dustry, many executives had an overwhelming majority of their compensation tied up in stock 
options. By its very nature, stock options encourage risk taking, and as a result, this compensa-
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tion structure encourages risky investments. Under this pay arrangement, executives enjoy the 
full potential of upside gain, but are not exposed to the downside risks. Consequently, execu-
tives had incentives to increase risk taking beyond optimal levels. The extent of this issue came 
to light in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. Following the Enron collapse, lawmakers in the 
United States implemented the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 to remedy the issue of executive 
compensation and misaligned incentives. However, the Act failed to properly deal with the 
issue of executive compensation through stock options, and therefore, during the financial 
crisis this risky compensation structure was still in place for most of the executives at large 
financial institutions. The financial transaction tax would have little ability to remedy distor-
tions in incentives for agents such as executives. Moreover, because most executive stock op-
tions have transfer restrictions, the tax would not even apply to these types of instruments. 
Although a financial transaction tax could limit the profitability of a division, it would not 
directly change the incentive structure of the agents.  
4.4 Effect on Asset Prices and Liquidity in Capital Markets 
4.4.1 Is Speculation Always the Enemy? High Frequency Trading and Liquidity 
 Conversely, speculation or high frequency trading is not uniquely harmful to the 
economy, but also brings about positive consequences. Indeed, some even argue that a finan-
cial transaction tax may not contribute to decreasing volatility in financial markets, but in con-
trast, could actually increase market volatility. Most empirical studies conclude that the rela-
tionship between the financial transaction tax and market volatility is inconclusive and that 
“higher transaction costs are associated with more, rather than less volatility” (McCulloch, 
2010). Matheson (2011, p. 20) reached similar conclusions and stated “if a [financial transac-
tion tax] reduces trading volume, it may decrease liquidity or, equivalently, may increase the 
price impact of trades, which will tend to heighten price volatility.” However, it is nearly un-
disputed that an increase in transaction cost will reduce trading volume. Most importantly, 
high frequency traders contribute to creating critical liquidity in financial markets. Trading is 
one of the primary creators of liquidity, and as a result, the high numbers of transactions that 
high frequency traders enter into facilitate the creation of liquidity in financial markets. How-
ever, although these trades do increase liquidity, it is not granted that this liquidity is essential 
to the proper functioning of financial markets. Matheson (2011) notes that the quality of li-
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quidity depends on several factors including (1) the nature of the security, (2) the time period 
over which liquidity is measured, (3) market conditions, (4) momentum factors, and (5) inves-
tors confidence. The nature of the security means that a blue chip stock has more liquidity 
than a share in a privately held, small company. This is due to several reasons, including the 
fact that investors have access to more information concerning larger companies, and the risks 
associated with investment in large companies is usually lower. Moreover, liquidity tends to be 
higher when measured over a longer period of time because the time frame is less likely to 
reflect temporary liquidity downturns. The tree remaining factors, in some sense, all relate to 
general market conditions. In normal market conditions, lack of liquidity issues rarely arises, 
and as such, any marginal liquidity changes to the already liquid security markets will reflect 
the law of diminishing returns. Some argue that increasing levels of computer generated trad-
ing for extremely short holding periods can make the security more liquid and lower the com-
pany’s cost of capital. In these non-crisis times, markets are already liquid, but during crisis 
times, high frequency traders tend not to increase, but rather deprive, the market of liquidity. 
This scenario came true with the so-called “Flash Crash” on May 6, 2010. The Flash Crash 
notably illustrated the contagion characteristics of market liquidity. On this day, concerns 
about the Greek debt crisis caused the Dow Jones to drop by more than 1,000 points at one 
point during trading (Lauricella, 2010). Moreover, a large sell order placed on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange led to similar pressure to sell due to computer generated algorithms that 
eliminated buy orders on the exchange. During the turmoil of this crash, it became clear that 
high frequency traders did not contribute the critical liquidity that the high frequency traders 
adamantly claim they provide to the market. In contrast, market makers commit to remain 
active regardless of the state of the markets. Therefore, Plender (2011) argues that rather than 
relying on high frequency traders and speculators to generate liquidity, the market makers 
should play the role of supplying liquidity. Moreover, large volume trading is not the only ac-
tivity that creates liquidity; liquidity is also dependent on investors having different valuations 
or investment strategy. That is, if all investors had the same perception of an asset’s value very 
little trading would occur because the primary driver of transactions is that the two parties to 
the transaction have a different opinion of future value. Here, high frequency traders do not 
play an important role in creating liquidity because they do not significantly affect other inves-
tors’ expectations of value. Overall, it is clear that high frequency traders play some role in 
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creating liquidity in financial markets, however, it is questionable whether this liquidity is es-
sential to the proper functioning of markets or merely constitutes excess liquidity.  
4.4.2 The Financial Transaction Tax and the Cost of Capital  
The financial transaction tax will also affect the cost of capital. The effect on the cost of 
capital will stem from multiple sources. First of all, the tax is likely to reduce investment on 
the macroeconomic level, which in turn will increase competition for capital, thereby raising 
the cost of capital because limited amounts of a resource will force investors bid up the price 
of that resource. Moreover, the cost of capital is likely to increase due to inferior liquidity in 
the market due to the reduction in trading volumes that will result from the implementation 
of the tax. Lastly, the tax will directly affect transaction cost—a development that is directly tied 
to lower asset prices. The introduction of the tax would increase transaction costs, which will 
cause investors to require higher returns on their investment to compensate for these higher 
costs. In essence, the effects of the financial transaction tax is a balancing between the desire 
to deter excess speculation and the increased cost of financing which may impede financing of 
real enterprise. Nevertheless, proponents of the tax argue that because the transaction tax is 
not directly taxing assets or dividends of assets, but merely the trade, the tax will not contrib-
ute to raising the cost of capital. While this argument facially holds up, the effects of the tax 
will indirectly contribute to raising the cost of capital. 
4.4.2.1 The Effect of Increased Transaction Costs on the Cost of Capital 
One significant factor in determining the cost of capital is transaction costs. In theory, 
higher transaction costs are associated with lower asset prices. Kenneth Rogoff (2011), former 
Chief Economist of the IMF, found that higher transaction taxes increase the cost of capital, 
eventually lowering capital investments. A lower investment amount would in turn reduce 
government revenues by largely offsetting the gain from the tax. In fact, multiple research re-
ports support the contention that the tax will increase the cost of capital. Matheson (2011) 
found that a financial transaction tax of 0.05 percent would have an effect on the cost of capi-
tal, although only a minor one. Similarly, the Staff of the European Commission (2011) noted 
that “[t]he tax can thus generate adverse effects on investment and the level of economic activi-
ty,” and argues that these effects will increase the cost of capital. Matheson (2011) concludes 
that a financial transaction tax of 0.02 percent reduced turnover on the S&P 500 to 0.8 years, 
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stock values would decline by 1 percent, which in turn would raise the cost of capital by 0.03 
percent. Moreover, empirical studies have suggested that the stamp duty in the United King-
dom negatively affected share prices (Staff of the European Commission, 2011). This is further 
evidence that the financial transaction tax may directly affect the financing of companies. 
  Transaction costs can include a variety of different expenses, including brokerage 
commissions, taxes, exchange fees, and bid-ask spreads. The bid–ask spread is a significant 
indicator of transaction costs and consists of three primary components: order processing 
costs, inventory risk, and information asymmetry (Pomeranets & Weaver, 2012). Reductions 
in transaction costs over the last few decades have resulted in a dramatic increase of trading 
activity, in particular high frequency trading. The decrease in transaction costs is primarily due 
to improvements in technology, deregulation, and innovation in financial markets. In fact, 
bid–ask spreads on the New York Stock Exchange today average about 0.1 percent, compared 
to 1.3 percent in the mid-1980s (Pomeranets & Weaver, 2012). The financial transaction tax 
will increase the cost of capital because the tax imposes additional transaction costs on the 
investors. The size of the effect on cost of capital will depend on many factors. First is the na-
ture of the instrument. Some shares are typically associated with long-term ownership, and 
these instruments will be less affected by the tax because these tend to be traded less frequent-
ly. On the other hand, there exist more volatile shares, typically associated with short-term 
ownership. Such a stock will likely see a higher effect from the tax. For example, if the average 
holding period of the first company is one month, while the second company is one day, the 
effect on these companies will vary greatly. For the first company, investors will face a financial 
transaction cost, associated with investment in this company of 2 x 12 x 0.1% x Enterprise 
value. The second company will have an effect of 2 x 250 x 0.1% x Enterprise value. Thus, the 
reduction in one year cash flows would be 2.4 percent and 50 percent, respectively, based 250 
trading days per year and the tax charged on both buying and selling the security. As such, in 
this sterilized scenario, the first company should experience a 2.4 percent fall in enterprise 
value and the second should fall by 50 percent. Similarly, because equity securities are general-
ly traded more frequently than corporate bonds, the impact of the financial transaction tax 
will likely be higher for equity markets than debt markets. Another reason why more frequent-
ly traded securities will have a more significant impact due to the imposition of the tax is be-
cause these securities tend to have narrower bid–ask spreads. Assets with narrower bid–ask 
spreads, such as blue chip companies, are typically more prone to high frequency trading, and 
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would also be more severely affected by the tax. The implementation of a financial transaction 
tax will disincentivize trading for narrow spreads because investors will not benefit from real-
locating assets in their portfolio to respond to minor instances of mispricing because the 
transaction cost incurred would be higher than the benefits received. This effect will be espe-
cially pronounced for investors with short holding periods, such as high frequency traders. As 
a result, the tax would have a much greater effect on equities with a high turnover such as 
large capitalization and blue chip stocks. Moreover, the tax would also constitute a relatively 
higher increase in cost compared to less frequently traded securities.  
Moreover, the financial transaction tax has two time-dimensions: the cost is incurred 
when the investor buys the asset and when the investor sells the asset. The effect of these addi-
tional costs will essentially be the same as taxing future dividends. Thus, one should be able to 
view the effect of these costs by utilizing Gordon’s Dividend Growth Model (1959). This mod-
el provides that the current price of an asset is a function of its future revenue streams. For an 
equity security this means that the share price can be determined by adding all future divi-
dends. The model is summarized as follows: 𝑃   =    𝐷!𝑟  –𝑔 
Here, P is the current share price, D1 is next time period’s dividend payment, r is the cost of 
equity capital for the company, and g is the annual growth in dividend.  Based on the model, 
it is clear that if the price of an asset is viewed as a function of a long stream of cash flows, a 
reduction in those cash flows will decrease the current price of the asset. Obviously, the tax 
would not have exactly the same effect as a tax on dividends because, while a tax on dividend 
imposes a frequent tax whenever the company gives dividends, the financial transaction tax 
would only affect the purchase and sale of that asset. Moreover, under this model, it is implic-
itly assumed that the investor’s capital requirement does not account for taxes and that the 
financial transaction tax would constitute a net loss for the investor, that is, absent other tax 
consequences, the price of the asset falls. Similarly, because the present value of the cash flows 
decline, investors will demand a higher return on their investment to make up for the lower 
amount of cash flows they will receive. One criticism against using the dividend growth model 
is that speculators are usually focused on identifying even minor mispricing in the asset. 
Therefore, it is not certain to what extent speculators even consider the discounted future cash 
flows in making investments. Various types of investors look to different factors when they 
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analyze the potential of an investment. Long-term investors try to evaluate the potential for 
growth, future cash flows, strength of the organization and the products or services it provides. 
If these investors do not consider such costs in investment, the effect of the financial transac-
tion tax on cost of capital will only be a function of the effect on long-term investors. Never-
theless, because the tax would reduce future cash flows, the dividend growth model still pro-
vides a useful analogy. Thus, the financial transaction tax will certainly impact firms on a mi-
cro-level, but the existence, and extent of, an effect on the macro-level would depend on the 
size of the tax and how investors respond to the implementation of the tax. 
4.4.2.2 A Revised Model – Considering Holding Periods 
In theory, under the Gordon Dividend Growth Model (1959), an investor has a perpe-
tuity view of ownership in an asset. Under this scenario, the value of a financial instrument 
should fall by the size of the tax, 0.1 percent for equity securities and bonds and 0.01 percent 
for derivatives. As demonstrated previously, nature of and typical holding period of a security 
will dictate the magnitude of the impact of the tax on the cost of capital. Consequently, in 
order to give a full view of the effect of the tax, it is necessary to expand the model to account 
for holding periods. 
𝑃   =      𝐷!(  1  –   𝑒– !–! !)(𝑟  –𝑔)(1  – 1  –𝑇 𝑒– !–! !) 
In this revised model, D1 is still next year’s dividend payment and P is the current share price. 
Similarly, r is the cost of equity capital for the company, N is the holding period, and g is the 
annual growth in dividend. Due to the additional elements, this model is less intuitive than 
the previous set-up. However, Matheson (2011) rearranges the equation to show the actual 
change one could expect from the financial transaction tax on the price of the asset: 
∆  = 1  –    (1  –   𝑒– !–! !)1  – (1  –𝑇)𝑒– !–! !   
Leaving all other factors unchanged, based on this model, the simple effect of the implementa-
tion of the tax would be to increase the size of the denominator. If T = 0, the parenthesis part 
of the denominator will fall away, and the price of the asset will remain unchanged. On the 
other hand, if the tax is above zero, the denominator will be higher, and thus, the value of the 
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fraction will go up. As a result, the delta factor will be less than 1, signifying a decrease in the 
share price. However, the assumption that all other factors remain unchanged is questionable.  
One potential way in which investors will try to adapt to the tax would be through an 
increase in holding periods. The effects on market prices and on the cost of capital are dimin-
ished with longer holding periods. By raising transaction costs, the tax would incentivize a 
longer holding period. This holds especially true for companies that are more prone to the 
effects of the tax, particularly blue chip companies with narrow bid–ask spreads. By holding 
longer-horizon assets, investors will benefit in two ways. First, assuming that the investor has a 
limited amount of resources to invest, a longer-term horizon means that the investor will have 
less free funds to invest and will therefore have a lower portfolio turnover. Lower portfolio 
turnover implies that the tax will be incurred with less frequency, thereby minimizing the 
overall tax burden. Second, because the tax is paid in two stages, a longer holding period 
would allow the investor to defer the second tax payment until disposing of the asset. Under 
our model, a longer holding period would decrease the size of the Euler element. For both the 
numerator and denominator the implementation of the tax will lead to an increase in those 
numerals. The overall effect will be to increase the size of the fraction, which means that a 
longer holding period would lead to a relatively smaller fall in the price of the asset.  
The “longer investment horizon effect” stands in contrast to a general corporate gains 
tax, where the generally increasing value of the investment necessitates that the tax burden will 
increase over time. That is, because the value of the investment will go up, the corresponding 
tax payment will also increase. The extent of this change would depend on an assessment of 
the cost of the financial transaction tax versus the cost of holding relatively longer-term securi-
ties. As such, the fall in share prices due to an increase in transaction costs may be partially 
offset by a change in investor behavior. 
4.4.2.3 Liquidity Effects on the Cost of Capital 
Moreover, the potentially inferior liquidity that may result from imposition of the finan-
cial transaction tax may, as discussed previously, increase the cost of capital. Increased trading 
leads to enhanced liquidity and lower transaction costs, which in turn, has a direct effect on 
the cost of financing for companies. If the financial transaction tax is imposed, the increased 
cost of financial transactions will contribute to reduced liquidity and higher cost of transac-
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tions. Although the Commission’s proposal exempts primary issuances of securities, trading in 
secondary markets is equally essential to creating liquidity for a security. Regardless of the sta-
tus of a security in the primary market, an investor will not be willing to put capital into the 
market if the investor has no way of extracting return on capital at a later time. Therefore, 
lower liquidity in the secondary markets will directly affect capital investors in the primary 
markets. Moreover, under the liquidity preference hypothesis, investors will prefer liquid in-
vestments to illiquid investments. Consequently, lower liquidity investments should, under 
this hypothesis, have lower prices in the market. This further reinforces the argument that a 
financial transaction tax may negatively affect share prices.  
4.4.3 Price Discovery Mechanisms 
Moreover, the implementation of a financial transaction tax may also impact the price 
discovery processes and market prices. A fundamental theory of finance is that prices are set by 
market participants through the process of trading assets. Price discovery refers to the process 
by which the market incorporates new information into market prices. In perfectly efficient 
markets prices immediately reflect new information as it becomes available. Without transac-
tion costs, investors are able to continuously update and rebalance their portfolios—and this 
rebalancing is inhibited by the presence of transaction costs, which in turn will make it more 
costly for the market to reflect new information. By engaging in various transactions, market 
participants with different beliefs of the value of an asset will drive the asset to its fundamental 
equilibrium. Here, the volume of trading plays an important role as the more frequently an 
asset is traded; the more likely the market is to correct deviations from the equilibrium. If the 
financial transaction tax lowers the volume of trading, even that performed by high frequency 
traders, the price discovery in the market will be constrained. Under the theory of market effi-
ciency and rational expectations, lower transaction costs and a higher level of transactions will 
lead to superior price discovery and more efficient markets. When price discovery is impeded, 
this may cause a greater autocorrelation of returns, which in turn could contribute to creating 
bubbles in financial markets. This is because the process helps restore prices toward their fun-
damental values, and inferior price discovery would lead to persistent mispricing in the mar-
ket.  
Moreover, mispricing of asset may impede the efficiency of markets by slowing down 
price corrections, thereby preventing the allocation of resources to their most efficient use. 
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However, the effect of the financial transaction tax may be even more complex. Financial mar-
kets do not function in such a way that an asset has “one” equilibrium price, but rather, inves-
tors’ expectations change with time and tend to follow swings of growth followed by a decline 
in market prices. These trends are known as “bull” for rising markets and “bear” for declining 
markets. Market participants adapt to these trends and try to take advantage of the fluctua-
tions by seeking to identify the trends, and acting in accordance with those trends. In practice, 
this means that investors will buy early on an uptick trend, and sell at the onset of a downward 
trend. In the last few years, these trends have become more distinct, and more aggressive. 
There are several factors that suggest that markets are not efficient, yet the policy of the finan-
cial transaction tax essentially relies on the assumption that markets are efficient and that 
traders act rationally. This assumption is questionable because these types of transactions are 
usually computer generated and performed in milliseconds. Therefore, it is unlikely that inves-
tors even have sufficient time to develop rational expectations of value. One situation that 
illustrates this issue is that trading has increased significantly over the last few decades, and 
high frequency trading is a relatively recent concept as well. At the same time, volatility has 
increased substantially. If a corresponding relationship existed between trading and price dis-
covery, one would not expect this inverse result. Therefore, the argument that the financial 
transaction tax will impede price discovery in financial markets will not necessarily be correct.  
Moreover, there is evidence that lower trading and higher transaction costs do not 
necessarily contribute to asset mispricing. Commonly, financial crises evolve from fundamen-
tal mispricing in the market. During times of economic expansion, prices increase, and the 
price of credit and collateral requirements usually decline. As more capital flows to the market, 
the market becomes saturated and as investors end up with lower quality investments, eventu-
ally a reversion of market prices will occur. For example, real estate markets traditionally have 
much higher transaction costs than financial markets, yet, the financial crisis erupted in large 
part due to severe mispricing in the real estate market. In this situation, it is clear that transac-
tion costs is not a decisive factor in creating volatility. Consequently, it is not certain that an 
increase in transaction cost through the financial transaction tax would actually contribute to 
eradicating or minimizing the risk of dramatic asset mispricing and bubbles. Instead, by impos-
ing a financial transaction tax, the reverse effect may occur, and the tax could actually slow 
down a correction in case of asset mispricing.  
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4.5 Lack of Globality 
Perhaps the most vocal criticism of the Commission proposal is that the proposed tax 
will only affect financial transactions involving EU financial institutions. In fact, the lack of 
global implementation has been the most significant obstacle for other previously proposed 
financial transaction taxes, including the Tobin Tax on foreign currency exchanges, which by 
its very definition must be implemented internationally. The three primary effects of the lack 
of global implementation are the issue of fiscal arbitrage, reduced competitiveness of EU 
economies, and risk of double taxation.  
4.5.1 Fiscal Arbitrage  
The first effect ties into the issues with implementation. Fiscal arbitrage is a way of “ex-
ploiting imperfections in the political and legislative processes by disguising spending measures 
as tax provisions,” in order to reduce taxation (Dean, 2011, p. 422). Whenever a measure is 
not implemented uniformly throughout the world, there is a risk of fiscal arbitrage. The pro-
posed EU financial transaction tax would apply a residency principle, which means that the 
tax applies if either party to the transaction is a financial institution “established in the territo-
ry of a Member State” (Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 3.1). Because the proposed EU fi-
nancial transaction tax would not be adopted globally, it is susceptible to tax avoidance 
through relocation. Although the residency principle provides some protection against reloca-
tion, because one party moving out of the jurisdiction is not sufficient to avoid the tax, the 
protection is by no means comprehensive. In part, globalized financial markets help create 
avoidance opportunities. Today, most large financial institutions have subsidiaries in the most 
important financial markets, including New York, Hong Kong, and Tokyo. The parties to the 
transaction may simply route the transaction through one of these jurisdictions, instead of via 
European Union countries where the transaction would normally take place. Because the tax 
does not apply based on the location of the security itself, but rather on the location of the 
parties, the same transaction could be conducted from anywhere in the world. Rerouting the 
transaction to a jurisdiction that does not impose the tax would be simple and would allow 
these companies to avoid the tax altogether. Moreover, many investors may simply restructure 
the transaction to make it seem as though the investor is located elsewhere. For example by 
moving capital outside the European Union, and investing via intermediaries in non-
European Union jurisdictions.  
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To illustrate one hazard of lack of globality, the international consulting firm KPMG 
summarized some of the basic differences between financial transaction tax proposals in 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The result of this work is 
summarized in a table, replicated as Table 2 in the Appendix. The primary problem with these 
taxes is that they all use different systems. Individual companies could simply choose to forum-
shop between these different jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, none of these companies 
will have to physically relocate, most likely they will be able to circumvent the tax simply by 
restructuring the transaction or by using a straw man in a different jurisdiction. 
4.5.2 Effect on Competitiveness of European Economies 
A related issue driving opposition to a financial transaction tax is concern that the levy 
will reduce competitiveness of the nation’s economy and create an uneven playing field with 
other nations. This holds particularly true for financial centers around the world that derive a 
high proportion of GDP from international financial market activities. The interconnected-
ness of financial markets around the world also leads to increased competition between finan-
cial centers. For example, in the situation above, a financial institution may initially be located 
in the European Union, however, upon implementation of the tax, and with the knowledge 
that the institution will be able to conduct nearly identical operations from a different juris-
diction, the institution may conclude that the benefits of relocating outweigh the disad-
vantages. Similarly, if regulation or other operative conditions become less favorable in one 
jurisdiction, investors will choose to move their money elsewhere due to the high mobility of 
capital. Currently, most of the world’s financial transactions are channeled through only a few 
markets, and competitive advantages may easily shift in favor of some financial centers. This 
explains the opposition of many countries to the Commission proposal, for example Malta, 
Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom—which all have significant financial centers, and rely 
greatly on the financial industry to create economic activity. In fact, nearly 75 percent of Eu-
ropean financial transactions are channeled through the City of London (BBC, 2012b). The 
governments of these countries are reluctant to impose additional costs on the financial ser-
vices industry because this could drive investors to other financial centers that do not impose 
such a tax. For example, the House of Lords has announced that it will oppose any proposal 
that is not implemented globally (House of Lords Press Release, 2011). The Press Release from 
the House of Lords recited concerns from City of London officials “that up to 80% of income 
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raised from the financial transaction tax could come from transactions based in London” 
(Ibid.). This concern received further legitimization when Michael Spencer, CEO of ICAP, the 
world’s largest interdealer broker, stated that if the proposal succeeds, the company would 
move their operations away from the European Union (BBC, 2012a). Similarly, CEO of Sam-
po Bank, the Finnish Subsidiary of Danske Bank, Johanna Lamminen, also threatened to re-
locate if Finland is one of the early adopters of the tax (Yle Uutiset, 2012). As such, this would 
not only deprive those countries of tax revenues from the financial transaction tax, but also 
other taxes, including the corporate tax. Moreover, these institutions also provide valuable 
jobs to the economy. In the long run, the decline in jobs could lead to a fall in wages. Conse-
quently, companies relocating due to the financial transaction tax may have much larger im-
pact beyond the mere loss of revenues from the financial transaction tax. 
Nevertheless, proponents of the tax argue that critics should not focus on the lack of 
global implementation, and state that Europe must set a precedent with the financial transac-
tion tax, and then other countries will follow. In fact, the proposal states that it intends to 
“pave the way towards a coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners” 
(Commission Proposal, 2011, p. 3). The German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, and 
Nicholas Sarkozy, former President of France, insist that the financial transaction tax is an 
important step for Europe. Schaeuble stated “[if] we go ahead with a FTT a lot of other parts 
of the world economy will follow us” (Dow Jones, 2011). Sarkozy expressed similar sentiments, 
“I remain convinced [the financial transaction tax] is possible [and] that it’s indispensable fi-
nancially given the crisis and that morally it is absolutely necessary” (Wroughton, 2011). 
Moreover, the IMF report (Matheson, 2011) specifically concluded that the tax could be im-
plemented in a smaller area, without necessarily failing. Overall, if the European countries 
implement a tax that is set at a reasonable level, the cost of having to restructure transactions 
or relocating companies will exceed those of complying with the tax. Because of the structure 
of the tax, simply moving the transaction offshore will not allow a party to avoid paying tax on 
that transaction. Therefore, the current scope of the proposal where the rate of the tax is set 
relatively low, should not present significant issues for implementation.  
4.5.3 Double Taxation  
Additionally, the tax could lead to double taxation issues. Usually, double taxation is 
governed by bilateral agreements between countries. Each such agreement prevents a taxpay-
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er—an individual or a corporation or other business entity—from paying excessive tax for the 
same taxable activity to two countries. These tax treaties would not normally cover the finan-
cial transaction tax, and consequently they would have to be revised to properly address the 
new double taxation issues that would arise due to the implementation of the Commission 
proposal. Revising tax treaties is both a time-consuming and complicated process, and would 
create extra costs for the countries implementing the tax. The issue with double taxation for 
the financial transaction tax pertains to determining the residency of one of the parties to the 
transaction. For example, a country that maintains multiple offices throughout the European 
Union could potentially be liable for tax to different countries. Under the definition of “estab-
lished in,” a financial institution is deemed established in a member state if it has been au-
thorized by a member state or if it has its registered seat, permanent address, usual residence, 
or a branch in a member state, if the transaction is carried out by that branch, or the member 
state where the counterparty to the financial transaction is established (Commission Proposal, 
2011, art. 3.1). This definition could plausibly lead to a financial institution having multiple 
residences within the European Union. Although the proposal further provides that taxation 
burdens are determined through a hierarchical order, disagreement can easily arise as to which 
conditions are satisfied (Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 3.2). In practice, however, the dou-
ble taxation issue might not be too problematic because most institutions located in the Euro-
pean Union require authorization by the primary country they are located in, and because the 
country of authorization maintains first priority, any other issues regarding residence will be 
moot because of lower priority. Notably, the situation where the parties are both located with-
in the European Union, and residence is easily identified, does not present double taxation 
issues. The Commission proposal clearly states that in the case of different financial institu-
tions, each institution is individually liable to its country of residence for the tax incurred 
(Commission Proposal, 2011, art. 9.1). Nonetheless, if a new tax is implemented in both 
countries that are parties to the agreement, this would force the parties to renegotiate the bi-
lateral agreement, or else the tax might have a disproportionate effect on financial institutions 
dealing between these two countries due to double taxation issues. Moreover, the provisions of 
the proposal do not adequately account for the situation where one party is located outside 
the European Union. In contrast, the French and German proposals reduce double taxation 
by cutting the tax in half where one party to the transaction is not located within the Europe-
an Union, provided that the country maintains a taxation treaty with either country. Conse-
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quently, one significant weakness of the European Commission proposal is the failure to 
properly account for double taxation issues that will result from imposing the financial trans-
action tax.  
4.5.4 Shift of Economic Activity to Jurisdictions with Lack of Transparency 
 Another risk of introducing a financial transaction tax is that the implementation of 
the tax could lead to increased prominence of tax havens. Although tax havens were long 
viewed as a type of “necessary evil” to facilitate tax competition among nations, leading to in-
creased mobility and efficiency in international capital markets, that attitude changed in the 
wake of the financial crisis. Following the recent economic downturn, many question whether 
tax havens should be subject to a stricter regulatory scheme because the harmful consequences 
significantly outweigh any benefits the tax havens might produce. Offshore tax havens hold 
trillions of dollars in assets—including more than half of all banking assets and a third of for-
eign investments by multinational corporations. As long as the financial transaction tax is not 
introduced globally, investors will have incentives to relocate outside the European Union. If 
investors have to incur costs of relocating, the likelihood that they will choose a jurisdiction 
that can offer even more cost-savings is high. Therefore, tax havens are likely to attract a lot of 
new activity. As a result, many believe that a financial transaction tax would increase the capi-
tal that flows through tax havens. Moreover, even in the absence of full relocation, tax havens 
are likely to see an increase in capital flows. Although tax havens account for only 3 percent of 
the world’s GDP, more than half of world trade passes through them. Between 1982 and 
2003, the economies of these countries grew at an annual average rate of 2.8 percent, more 
than twice the rate of the rest of the world (1.2 percent). The sheer size of the economic activi-
ty in tax havens demonstrates that it is not necessary to maintain a physical presence in order 
to channel financial transactions through tax havens. The problem with increased capital flows 
through tax havens is that while tax havens claim to offer potential investors financial privacy, 
limited regulation, and low tax rates, these jurisdictions have also become sanctuaries for tax 
evasion, financial fraud, and money laundering. The undesirable activity that takes place in 
the shadow of regulatory authorities is likely to increase should the financial transaction tax be 
implemented in the European Union. Therefore, a financial transaction tax may indirectly 
encourage higher activity in tax havens, which would also take these transactions outside the 
overview of other important regulations, including protections for fraud or other taxes. This 
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could contribute to an increase in risk due to the inferior supervision. On the flip side, if the 
tax is introduced globally, this could be an important tool in limiting the number of transac-
tions that flow through tax havens. If such a tax was made global, companies and investors 
cannot migrate the funds to tax havens to avoid the tax, and thus, would reduce the incentives 
for using tax havens. Consequently, a global financial transaction tax could in fact contribute 
to minimize erosion of tax bases caused by the use of tax havens.  
4.6 Harmonization of the Internal Market 
 In a memorandum accompanying the financial transaction tax proposal, the European 
Commission also emphasized the need to harmonize and establish minimum standards for 
taxation of financial transactions within the European Union. In arguing why the tax was nec-
essary, it stated: “to avoid fragmentation in the internal market for financial services, bearing 
in mind the increasing number of uncoordinated national tax measures being put in place” 
(Commission Proposal, 2011). Ten countries in the European Union have implemented some 
variety of the financial transaction tax. The Commission argues that this type of unilateral 
action distorts competition in the internal market. The proposal would require the member 
states to repeal existing financial transaction laws, including the stamp duties currently in 
place in the United Kingdom. The proposal will prevent capital flight from European member 
states that have already implemented such a tax to those states that have not. Moreover, the 
proposal will ensure that the taxes within the European Union are somewhat uniform, and 
thus provide more consistency across the internal market. It is important to note that the pro-
posal only gives a minimum base line for what each member state must charge, and therefore, 
complete consistency will not be achieved through this proposal. The need for harmonization 
of the internal market is a two-prong consideration: (1) avoiding double taxation and (2) dis-
tortion of competition (Staff of the European Commission, 2011). Both the need for harmo-
nization to avoid double taxation and to avoid distortion have been discussed previously. Im-
portantly, the necessity of avoiding distortions is clear from the wide range of taxes that are 
currently imposed by EU member states. However, the wide array of taxes tends to show that 
the proposal really is more of a complement, rather than a substitute, to the current scheme.  
 Moreover, the recent development with the European Commission proposal permit-
ting several countries to proceed under the enhanced cooperation framework may pose addi-
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tional problems for harmonization of the internal market. While the Commission has previ-
ously emphasized the necessity of EU-wide implementation to ensure conformity across the 
member states, it is questionable how this rationale plays into the enhanced cooperation. Po-
tentially, allowing these eleven member states, in addition to the member states with taxes 
already in place, to levy a financial transaction tax may seem like a way to pressure the holdout 
states into joining the cooperation. However, the logic behind that argument easily fails. The 
member states currently holding out are unlikely to join for two reasons. First, these countries 
tend to be those with large financial centers that do not want to impose the tax because it 
might harm the financial industry. Whether other countries introduce the financial tax is un-
likely to affect those member states’ desire to protect the financial industry. Second, if only a 
few countries within the European Union introduce the tax, the non-joining member states 
may see an increase in financial transaction from investors that want to avoid the tax. Because 
of the open market, these investors will retain most of the advantages of operating within the 
European Union, yet will be able to avoid the tax by conducting the transaction from a coun-
try that does not utilize the financial transaction tax. Consequently, this recent development 
may negatively impact the harmonization of the internal market. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
the European Union permitted these countries to introduce the tax for the simple reason that 
most of the prominent politicians within the European Union have a strong desire that the 
financial transaction tax be implemented throughout the Union. Although the holdout states 
are unlikely to introduce the tax on their own, the fact that a large number of member states 
will now have a financial transaction tax may be an important bargaining chip further down 
the road to ensure that all member states eventually introduce the tax. As a result, the goal of 
harmonization of the internal market may not be immediately reached, but could potentially 
be accomplished once all member states join the proposal.  
4.7 Implementation Issues  
 Another major issue is how a financial transaction tax should work in practice. A 
common criticism of the financial transaction tax is the perceived difficulty of implementa-
tion. Critics argue that the structure of a financial transaction tax makes it difficult to monitor 
compliance with the tax, and will make it easy to avoid the tax burden. However, some version 
of a financial transaction tax is currently implemented in forty countries, a fact which not only 
demonstrates the feasibility of such a tax, but may also work as a model for how the tax should 
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be implemented. Additionally, the Commission intends to use the financial transaction tax to 
close various loopholes in the current taxation system. First, the tax would aim to reduce relo-
cation effects. Second, by excluding the primary market the tax would isolate the effects of the 
tax on the financing of companies. Third, the tax would only target transactions by financial 
institutions, but exclude instruments that are designed for financing companies such as bank 
lending and retained earnings. 
4.7.1 Consolidation of Taxes and the Fiscal Balance 
Financial transaction taxes can be imposed in three different ways. First, the tax can be 
an addition to existing taxes. Under this method the tax would, as a policy matter, contribute 
to fiscal consolidation by reducing fiscal deficits and accumulation of debt. The benefit of fis-
cal consolidation is that it would reduce the cost of new borrowing—a feature that is particular-
ly important today when many European countries are struggling with increasing amounts of 
public debt and high fiscal deficits. The reason why borrowing becomes less expensive is anal-
ogous to why wealthier individuals receive better rates for their loans than relatively poorer 
individuals. By increasing the fiscal revenues, countries will have more sources of revenues to 
repay the loan, thereby reducing the risk to the lender who will then extend a loan at a lower 
rate to reflect that lower risk. Second, the tax could be fiscally neutral, meaning that the gov-
ernment would remove or reduce other taxes such that the financial transaction tax would 
have no effect on net aggregate demand. However, finding a balance to implement a fiscally 
neutral financial transaction tax would likely be difficult due to its inherently progressive na-
ture. The financial transaction tax would primarily affect higher-income individuals and busi-
ness entities, and therefore the government policy to even the fiscal balance would likely bene-
fit household income. In general, relatively poorer households spend a higher proportion of 
their marginal income, which in turn would cause aggregate demand to rise. Third, the pro-
ceeds of the tax could be spent at the European level, for example through investment in in-
frastructure, which could also contribute to increasing aggregate demand for consumption. 
Based on the European Commission proposal, the tax will at least in part be implemented 
using method three. In contrast, whether methods one or two will depend on the individual 
implementation in each country. 
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4.7.2 Characteristics of a Sound Implementation of the Financial Transaction Tax  
The key to successful implementation is two-faceted. First, legislators must seek to min-
imize tax avoidance. Second, the tax should be implemented in such a way to ensure efficiency 
and low cost of compliance. For the first point it is important to note that no tax will ever 
have a 0 percent avoidance or evasion rate,5 and the key will be to maximize the revenue from 
increased compliance over the cost of enforcement. An efficient tax should seek minimize 
deadweight losses and opportunities for avoidance. The U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice (2005) defines a deadweight loss as when “tax rules cause individuals to change their be-
havior in ways that ultimately leave them with lower-valued combinations of [choices] than 
they would have obtained if the tax system did not affect their behavior.” For the financial 
transaction tax, this scenario could take place if the tax discourages productive activities, in-
cluding regular trading and hedging activities. In the worst scenario, this could lead to lower 
GDP and poorer corporate risk management. This result could be further reinforced if the 
participants that engage in undesirable activity manage to avoid the tax, either through relocat-
ing or restructuring transactions. Additionally, there is a risk that implementation of the tax 
could lead to capital flight outside the European Union, and consequently, the implementa-
tion strategy must be developed in such a way to minimize the possibilities for avoidance. 
For the second point, it is important that the tax does not impose significant costs of 
administration. Moreover, the tax should not be unduly burdensome or costly to administer 
for the taxing authority, or impose high costs of compliance on taxpayers. The European Un-
ion has not yet clarified the details of collection and implementation, however, there exists a 
broad consensus that collection of the tax through clearinghouses would be both simple and 
inexpensive, and would also facilitate a high compliance rate. Schmidt (2010) argued that “it is 
technically easy to collect a financial tax from exchanges . . . transactions taxes can be collected 
by the central counterparty at the point of the trade, or automatically in the clearing or settle-
ment process.” Nobel Prize winning economist, Paul Krugman (2009), similarly stated “mod-
ern trading is a highly centralized affair . . . . while traders are all over the place, a majority of 
                                                
5.   To a certain extent all taxes create incentive for avoidance. Any taxpayer, whether an individual or a corporation, 
universally pursues two fundamental goals: to reduce taxable income and to defer tax liabilities. One can achieve these goals 
through both legal and illegal actions, giving rise to the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance 
represents the use of legal resources to achieve the lowest possible tax burden or to defer a tax burden until a later time (Black, 
2009, p. 1599). Tax evasion, on the other hand, is the act of not paying taxes that one is legally required to pay (Black, 2009, 
p. 1599). Although there is a distinction between evasion and avoidance, this thesis will only use the term tax avoidance.  
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their transactions are settled . . . at a single London-based institution. Most of these transac-
tions are already subject to reporting requirements, and central clearinghouses already collect 
various fees. This centralization keeps the cost of transactions low . . . . [and] makes these 
transactions relatively easy to identify and tax.” The only part of the proposal that may prove 
challenging for collection is derivatives because these tend to be subject to fewer requirements 
and are thus more difficult to identify. However, there is a growing trend of centralization, 
even for derivatives, which would make efficient collection of the financial transaction tax 
even greater over time. Although the European Union has yet to clearly state how the tax will 
be collected, based on the overwhelming practicality of the clearinghouse method, it seems 
likely that the European Union would use this method.  
Although many critics argue that the difficulties of implementation will be the primary 
obstacle for a financial transaction tax, there is no substantive basis to believe that a financial 
transaction tax is more difficult to implement than most other taxes. In order to successfully 
impose a financial transaction tax, authorities must be able to identify three characteristics of a 
transaction: (1) the taxable event, and whether a taxable event has occurred; (2) the tax base; 
and (3) the person executing the taxable event. A “taxable event” is an event that triggers taxa-
tion for the party who executes the event (Klein, Bankman & Shaviro, 2006). The financial 
transaction tax is applied on an individual transaction basis, and because these transactions 
are subject to a legal duty to record, identification of the taxable event, the tax base, and the 
taxable party should be straightforward. Consequently, identifying the necessary transaction 
information would be easier than for many other taxes. The IMF report (Matheson, 2011) 
specifically looks at the tax as it would apply to three different instruments: (1) exchange-
traded instruments, (2) over-the-counter instruments, and (3) foreign exchange instruments. 
The paper notes that for exchange-traded instruments, the financial transaction tax would be 
beneficial due to the comprehensive regulation that already apply to these transactions, both 
from national regulatory agencies as well as listing exchanges. This would provide taxing au-
thorities with a record of the taxable event, the size of the tax base, and the date of the transac-
tion. Additionally, the clearinghouses themselves could collect the tax, similar to the function-
ing of the VAT. Category (2) over-the-counter instruments, on the other hand, may be slightly 
more difficult to implement. Because these transactions are generally subject to fewer regulato-
ry requirements, the record of these transactions is also inferior. However, the report notes 
that several countries already levy taxes on OTC transactions, including the Swiss stamp tax. 
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Moreover, new regulatory requirements often mandate reporting of all trades, whether they 
occur on an exchange or not. As a result, the practical difficulties may not be greater than 
what any other tax would present. Although category (3) is less relevant because it is not in-
cluded in the Commission proposal, the IMF report finds that a tax on these transactions 
could easily be facilitated through international settlement organizations such as the continu-
ous linked settlement (CLS). One should, however, be aware that new innovation in financial 
instruments might facilitate tax avoidance through increasingly complex structures developed 
for the purpose of avoiding taxes. Nevertheless, it appears that any claims regarding the diffi-
culties of collecting the tax would be strongly exaggerated.  
Additionally, if the European Commission makes the transaction contingent on the 
payment of the tax, investors will find the tax more difficult to avoid. By denying the transfer 
of ownership, the investor will not receive title to the security, and therefore will not be enti-
tled to dividends or voting rights while the tax remains unpaid. In response, some argue that 
this would make investors purchase the derivative of a security instead, and because many de-
rivatives are not traded on exchanges, the tax would be easier to avoid. Moreover, because an-
yone can issue a derivative instrument on a security, there is no requirement that they are is-
sued in the same country as the underlying company is domiciled. This creates a disconnect 
between the derivative and underlying security, which gives rise to avoidance opportunities, 
and needs to be addressed. The sheer size of the derivatives market—and the significant role 
speculative activity using derivatives plays in creating financial instability—mandates that the 
tax should be applied to these instruments as well as the European Commission proposal 
does. But it should be noted that there is a problem with taxing derivatives for the purpose of 
reducing instability. Investors often take different positions in a derivative and the underlying 
security to protect against downside risk. By taxing both the derivative instrument and the 
underlying security, a risk-minimizing hedging investor will be liable for tax on both transac-
tions, and consequently the cost of hedging risk would be increased. Although the cost may 
seem de minimis for large companies that trade in high volumes, the tax could have a signifi-
cant impact on risk-reducing measures. One way to address this inconsistency could be to tax 
derivatives on an investment basis rather than a transaction basis. This would allow the taxing 
authorities to mitigate some of the effects of multiple transactions by not taxing every transac-
tion. However, this approach would likely eviscerate any effects such a tax would have on high 
frequency trading. Moreover, many large financial institutions, including pension funds, in-
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surance companies, and international banks, are subject to strict regulatory requirements, 
which prohibits ownership of securities through subsidiaries, and therefore, owning securities 
under a legal title would be an impossibility.  
4.7.3 Lessons from Past Financial Transaction Taxes 
 Conversely, the various financial transaction taxes that have been implemented thus 
far may also offer advice on improper methods for implementation. In 1984, Sweden tried to 
implement a tax on financial transactions. The issue with this tax was that it was designed in 
such a way that tax avoidance was unproblematic. The Swedish financial transaction tax was a 
0.5 percent levied on the purchase or sale of any equity security, and later fixed-income in-
struments, by Swedish residents (Aldridge, 2009). The tax was collected through brokers, and 
the tax could easily be avoided by directing the transaction through a foreign market. Moreo-
ver, because the size of the Swedish tax was very high, much higher than the one proposed by 
the EU Commission, investors had added incentive to try to avoid the tax. The prevalence of 
tax avoidance was perceived as unfair by the Swedish brokers because the government was not 
receiving tax from the transactions now channeled through foreign countries, and the reloca-
tion significantly hurt the brokerage industry. Over the course of the life of the tax, trading 
volume in Sweden declined by 30 percent, futures trading and options trading fell to nearly 
zero, and bond trading fell by 80 percent (Aldridge, 2009). The issues with implementation 
eventually forced Sweden to discontinue this tax. Similarly, Hungary’s recent experiences with 
the financial transaction tax may also be illustrative of some of the issues with revenue raising 
using the tax. Hungary implemented a financial transaction tax in 2010. Although the meas-
ure was initially intended as temporary for two years only, the tax has since been doubled and 
is not likely to be removed anytime soon  (Holmes, 2012). The tax assessed a 0.5 percent levy 
on the assets of financial institutions. However, the tax turned out to cause large financial 
trouble for Hungarian financial institutions. In March 2011, OTP bank, Hungary’s largest 
lender, reported a fourth quarter profit decline of 15 percent, and that amount was 12 percent 
over the entire year. The bank’s report stated that but-for the financial transaction tax, the 
bank’s profits would have increased by 4 percent. Other banks reported similar woes as a re-
sult of the financial transaction tax, and bank credit growth rates in Hungary fell sharply. As 
such, is clear that lessons should be drawn from previous failures of the financial transaction 
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tax, and that a plan that seems desirable on paper may not yield the intended effects in prac-
tice.  
The primary lesson to be learned from the Swedish failure is that incentive to avoid a 
tax will be present whenever the cost of paying the tax is higher than the cost of avoiding it. 
Therefore, one key to successful implementation will be to avoid setting the tax too high. 
Moreover, avoidance costs are lower when it is difficult to identify the taxable event or person 
liable for the taxes. For example, in order to levy personal income taxes on an individual, tax 
authorities must be able to identify and locate the person, and have a method for determining 
whether a taxable event has occurred, and the amount of the tax base. Generally, taxes levied 
on the basis of location or domicile of the taxpayer are easier to avoid than taxes based on a 
specific activity. Therefore, one method of avoiding the failure of the Swedish tax is to make 
the tax applicable to all purchases of securities, and this tax could only be avoided by setting 
up actual foreign entities to trade in the securities—a much more expensive way of avoiding tax 
liability. Moreover, although many fear that financial institutions will move outside the Euro-
pean Union, it is highly unlikely that a company would choose to reincorporate solely based 
on the financial transaction tax alone. This holds especially true in light of the fact that corpo-
rate taxes, which represent a much larger portion of corporate tax liability, are generally much 
higher in Europe than the rest of the world. Therefore, financial institutions would be much 
more likely to relocate on the basis of those taxes. Nevertheless, there is a risk that more finan-
cial institutions may channel transactions through subsidiaries located in other countries, es-
pecially tax havens. In 2007, Citigroup had 427 subsidiaries in tax havens, Morgan Stanley 
273, Bank of America 115, Lehman Brothers 57, JP Morgan Chase 50, Goldman Sachs 29, 
and AIG 18 (Klinger, Collins & Sklar, 2010, p. 4). It would be easy for these large financial 
institutions to direct more trades through these subsidiaries. However, a similar argument 
could be made for individual tax liability and personal or capital income taxes. Consequently, 
to evaluate the extent of the risk of avoidance, and to design a tax structure to minimize the 
risk, legislators should look to past effects on relocation due to implementation of previous 
financial transaction taxes. 
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5. INNOVATIVE FINANCING AND THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX 
 The concept of innovative financing was introduced at a United Nations conference 
on developing counties in 2002 (Douste-Blazy, 2011). Innovative financing has been described 
as a “range of non-traditional mechanisms to raise additional funds for development aid 
through innovative projects such as micro-contributions, taxes, public-private partnerships and 
market-based financial transactions” (World Health Organization, 2011, p. 85). The first initi-
ative was a result of efforts by the campaign Action Against Hunger and Poverty—an organiza-
tion formed by President Jacques Chirac, President Ricardo Lagos, and President Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva (Douste-Blazy, 2011). This cooperation led to the launch of UNITAID in 2006, a 
cooperative between the French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy and President Jacques 
Chirac, President Lula of Brazil, and the governments of Chile, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom. UNITAID’s first act was to establish a minor tax on airline tickets, with the pro-
ceeds going to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria treatments. Today, that tax raises approx-
imately 350 million dollars annually and is viewed as a large success with respect to supporting 
various causes (Douste-Blazy, 2011). The purpose of these initiatives is to allow the United 
Nations to meet its Millennium Development Goals—a collection of goals that the United 
Nations and other international organizations have aimed to achieve by 2015. The goals com-
prise eight different categories: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary 
education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, lowering child mortality rates, 
improving maternal health, combating, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, furthering 
environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development (United 
Nations, 2012). Chairman of UNITAID, Philippe Douste-Blazy, recently expressed that an 
international tax on financial transactions should be another policy tools for funding devel-
opmental objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals.  
 Similarly, many commentators are now focusing on the role that a financial transaction 
tax might play in combating adverse climate change. Sixty-three charities, including Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace, joined forces to encourage U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
to introduce a financial transaction tax where the profits would go to fight climate change 
(Morales, 2012). The address to Hillary Clinton is a continuation of a previous proposal pre-
sented to a UN-appointed panel, and the group urged the Secretary to support a financial 
transaction tax “to pay for international public goods at climate change negotiations . . . .” 
 68 
(Ibid.). The UN panel summarized its findings in a 2010 report, where it suggested that the tax 
could create revenues of around $27 billion per year, and auctions of climate quotas could 
generate another $38 billion (UN High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, 
2010). Additionally, the panel discussed the potential for implementing taxes on shipping, 
aviation, and electricity consumption.  
 Moreover, in the United States a proposal has been set forth in The Inclusive Prosperi-
ty Act (H.R. 6411) to use the proceeds of a financial transaction tax to fund job creation. The 
bill was introduced in 2012 by Representative Keith Ellison, and would tax the sale of stocks, 
bonds, and derivatives by U.S. financial institutions. The size of the tax would be 0.5 percent 
on stocks, 0.1 percent on bonds, and 0.005 percent on derivatives. The preamble states that 
the purpose of the bill is “[t]o impose a tax on certain trading transactions to strengthen our 
financial security, expand opportunity, and stop shrinking the middle class.” The bill was 
mostly launched as a response to the significant bailouts paid by the U.S. government in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, and the bill notes that “[t]he global financial crisis cost Ameri-
cans $19 trillion in lost wealth,” and that American citizens contributed $600 billion to trou-
bled companies. Furthermore, the bill attributes the crisis to financial firms and their 
“[d]eceptive, illegal, and speculative financial practices.” Because the crisis led to a high rate of 
unemployment and a decrease in disposable income, Representative Ellison argues that a fi-
nancial transaction tax should be imposed to even out the benefits received by the financial 
institutions (Congressman Keith Ellison, 2012). He further argues that the tax could be used 
to invest in education, health, and communities throughout the United States.  
Although some challenges exist to using the proceeds of a tax on financial transactions 
to benefit social goals, proponents point out that proceeds of taxes are frequently used on 
causes other than the original source of the tax. For example, in the United States property 
taxes are used to fund expenditures on the educational system (PBS, 2008). However, many 
argue that tax revenues are usually more properly served when they fund the overall budget, 
which allows more efficient allocation of tax expenditures. In fact, the European Commission 
proposal would use two thirds of the revenues of the tax to fund the overall EU budget, there-
by reducing the national contributions. The last third would be retained by each member state 
(European Commission Press Release, 2012). Nevertheless, using the funds of a financial 
transaction tax to subsidize or support social goals could provide a method of aligning the in-
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centives of the financial sector with international and social development. Such a distribution 
would ensure that growth in the financial industry also guaranteed contributions to other sec-
tors that are perceived to be more “deserving” by the general public. Therefore, even though it 
is not in the current European Commission plan, using at least parts of the proceeds of the tax 
to fund development goals could potentially contribute to higher support for the proposal, 
and may be the key to securing international cooperation regarding a financial transaction tax.  
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6. ALTERNATIVES TO A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that a financial transaction tax is not neces-
sarily well suited to accomplish the stated goals of the European Commission. Commentators 
argue that a financial transaction tax is not the proper method because such a tax would create 
significantly less income than other methods. They further argue that because the patterns of 
high frequency trading are so well entrenched, a financial transaction tax is unlikely to change 
the behavior of market participants. Consequently, any thorough critique of the financial 
transaction tax must evaluate the feasibility of alternative solutions. Moreover, the financial 
transaction tax is an autonomous proposal and exists in a vacuum from other proposed ap-
proaches. The inherent complexities of the financial system makes an independent proposal 
such as the European Commission proposal improperly suited to present a comprehensive 
solution to the regulatory challenges that exist with the financial transaction tax. Consequent-
ly, a proper response will require a wide range of policies—both fiscal and regulatory. This sec-
tion of the thesis will present a few alternative options that should be considered for remedy-
ing the problems that the financial transaction tax aims to correct. The section will divide the-
se alternatives into two categories: taxes and regulatory reforms.  
6.1 Alternative Tax Structures as an Option to the Financial Transaction Tax 
A tax levied on financial transactions is not the only tax policy tool that could be help-
ful in reducing systemic risk, and indeed, many argue that the financial transaction tax would 
not be the most appropriate form for a taxation of the financial sector for this purpose. The 
IMF report that argued against the introduction of a financial transaction tax, instead suggest-
ed two other types of taxes: a “Financial Stability Contribution” and a financial activities tax. 
Notably, the financial activities tax has also been discussed in the context of a Norwegian tax 
on financial institutions. Additionally, the stamp duty tax, which is currently implemented in 
several European countries, may prove a realistic alternative to the financial transaction tax.  
6.1.1 Financial Activities Tax 
One alternative that may be superior to the financial transaction tax is the financial ac-
tivities tax, a tax levied on profits and remuneration of financial institutions, and this tax may 
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be a preferable means of taxing the financial sector. The financial activities tax is a tax levied 
on revenue and wages in order to approximate the value of financial institutions. The IMF 
report advocates for a financial activities tax levied on profits of financial institutions, with a 
varying rate depending on the individual risks of the financial institutions. This type of tax is 
currently levied in several countries, including, Israel, Italy, parts of Canada, and France 
(Matheson, 2011). The two primary arguments in favor of a financial activities tax is (1) it 
would be able to generate more revenue at a lower cost and it is less susceptible to avoidance 
through relocation and. In essence, the primary difference between the financial transaction 
tax and the financial activities tax is that the latter seeks to increase the tax burden on the fi-
nancial sector only in times of excess profits. Moreover, contrary to the financial transaction 
tax, the financial activities tax is imposed on general income, while the financial transaction 
tax is only imposed on trading activities.  
First of all, proponents argue that the financial activities tax may be much better suited 
for raising revenues, while simultaneously reducing systemic risk in the financial industry. For 
example, Matheson (2011) estimates that even a 5 percent financial activities tax in the United 
Kingdom would raise about 0.3 percent of GDP. In fact, even the Staff of the European 
Commission’s (2011) Impact Assessment of the financial transaction tax recognizes some of the 
benefits with the financial activities tax over the financial transaction tax: 
The analysis of macroeconomic impacts . . . suggests that the economic 
distortions related to raising revenue could be lower with a FAT com-
pared to an FTT. Model simulations indicate that the short-term effect 
of a 5% FAT on GDP could be limited to around 0.10% while the 
long-term effect is simulated to reach about half a per cent (deviation of 
GDP from its long-run baseline), against annual tax revenues of around 
0.2% of GDP. 
In contrast, the proposed financial transaction tax would create annual revenue of 0.1 percent 
of GDP but could cause distortions as large as 1.76 percent in the long run (European Com-
mission, 2011). Moreover, the European Commission (2011) found that in order to match the 
revenue-raising abilities of the financial transaction tax, the financial activities tax would have 
to be set at a minimum of 10 percent. This level may be so high that it would encourage tax 
avoidance. 
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 Second, proponents of the financial activities tax argue that a financial activities tax is 
superior because the consequences of the tax are more likely to be borne by those operating in 
the financial sector. In contrast to the financial transaction tax, the financial activities tax is 
much more difficult to avoid or pass onto third parties. Moreover, the financial activities tax 
more closely resembles the effect of the VAT. This is preferable because the financial activities 
tax would have no direct effect on the structure of financial activities since the tax would be 
levied on profits. However, in contrast to the VAT, the tax would only be applied on excessive 
economic rents, not all profits. When the tax is levied on the number of transactions, the fi-
nancial institutions may simply try to find alternative ways of restructuring trades, but compa-
nies will always seek to maximize profits. Therefore, a tax levied on profits, or a proxy thereof, 
is less likely to be subject to avoidance. In practice, there are three types of financial activities 
taxes. The revenue and likelihood of avoidance of the tax would depend on the scope of cov-
erage for remuneration and profits. The more closely the tax base resembles profits, or eco-
nomic rents, the less likely is it that financial institutions will try to avoid it or try to pass it on 
to others. In its report, the IMF (2011) distinguishes between three different levels: a broad 
FAT, which would tax the total sum of profits and wages; a FAT that taxes the rents of finan-
cial institutions, that is, profits in excess of the “normal” level; and a FAT that taxes excessive 
returns. Of the three taxes, the first FAT most closely resembles VAT. Moreover, in times 
where financial institutions are not earning excess economic rents, the tax will not be charged. 
This also reduces the chance of avoidance, as financial institutions are less likely to worry 
about the tax if it is only imposed on extraordinary profits. Conversely, for large financial in-
stitutions that present a risk to the stability of the financial system by presenting a “too-big-too-
fail” risk, will be taxed proportionally more due to their high profits. However, the financial 
activities tax is not immune to avoidance opportunities, and the risk for avoidance may be 
considerable for certain financial institutions. Most large financial institutions have subsidiar-
ies throughout the world, and therefore, the financial institution, which would be subject to 
the tax, may simply shift the profits to a subsidiary or parent located in a country that does not 
impose the tax. Obviously, such transfers would be closely scrutinized by taxing authorities, 
however, large amounts of capital flows internally in a financial conglomerate and therefore 
monitoring each transaction to determine whether it is a legitimate transaction not solely 
aimed at avoiding taxation would be extremely difficult and costly. As a result, it is evident 
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that the financial activities tax may in fact present more significant issues of implementation 
than the financial transaction tax.   
One significant question is how the financial activities tax is distinct from the income 
tax. Unlike the income tax, the financial activities tax would not seek to tax all profits, but 
merely excess or extraordinary profits over the ordinary cost of capital. Because of the structure 
of the tax, it would mitigate excessive risk taking by financial institutions since after-tax returns 
would go down, reducing incentives to take extraordinary risks. Moreover, the financial activi-
ties tax would be easy to implement since it mimics already existing taxes. It is common that 
authorities tax profits and withhold remuneration. The financial transaction tax also appears 
to receive more support from the financial sector. In expressing support for the proposal, Peter 
Sime, Head of Research for ISDA noted “the FTT would be indiscriminate, whereas with a 
[financial activities tax] you are looking more at the bank’s specific balance sheet and earnings” 
(House of Lords, 2012, Q69).  
The primary criticism of the financial activities tax is difficulty of implementation. In 
order to properly comply with the goals of the tax, the taxing authority would need to find a 
way to distinguish “regular” profits from “excessive” profits. Moreover, because there is no 
distinction between the types of “excessive” profits, desirable activity may also be subject to the 
tax for the simple reason that the financial institution is making money. Others contend that 
the financial transaction tax is superior to the financial activities tax because the former would 
discourage risky high frequency trading, and promote stability in financial markets. Economist 
Sony Kapoor argued that a combination of bank levies and financial transaction taxes would 
be a better solution because it would provide a more comprehensive strategy (House of Lords, 
2012, Q87). Similarly, many argue that a financial activities tax would impede growth, and 
that it would in fact be passed onto consumers, but instead of a direct pass-through like the 
financial transaction tax, it would likely be passed on to consumers via higher pricing of ser-
vices. Another key reason why the European Commission prefers the financial transaction tax 
to the financial activities tax is that the former would more effectively address the problems of 
high frequency trading (House of Lords, 2012, Q124). If the European Commission truly 
wants to limit excessive risk taking and hazardous trading in the economy, effectively dealing 
with this type of trading will be imperative. Similarly, neither tax would remedy distortions in 
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financing decisions or incentives to take on excess leverage among financial institutions creat-
ed by the favorable treatment of debt capital.  
6.1.2 The Norwegian Efforts for a Financial Activities Tax 
In 2009, Norwegian legislators created the Financial Crisis Commission (Finanskriseut-
valget) for the purpose of stabilizing the financial sector, increasing its contribution to the 
overall economy, limiting its size, and to prevent harmful activities in the sector. Among the 
options, the Crisis Commission discussed various taxes, and eventually proposed the imple-
mentation of a “stability fee”—a fee that would represent the reduced risk creditors face as a 
result of government bailouts. Moreover, the Commission suggested that Norwegian authori-
ties look further into the prospects of implementing an activity tax on financial transactions. 
This type of tax would be similar to the UK bank levy and would be a tax on the profits and 
salaries achieved within the financial sector. This step is in large part a reaction to the fact that 
the financial sector is exempted from the VAT. The Crisis Commission also brought up the 
possibility of a financial transaction tax, but expressed concern, however, that this type of tax 
could cause a distortion of market activity and reduce the competiveness of the economy 
(Prop. 1 LS (2012–2013)). It should be noted that Norway already has legislation in place for 
transaction-based taxes. This law currently imposes a transaction fee on the sale of real proper-
ty; however, the rate for transfers of stock is currently set at 0 percent (Dokumentavgiftsloven, 
1976). In the Norwegian national budget for the year 2012 (Prop. 1 LS (2011 – 2012)), the 
Ministry of Finance analyzed two primary methods for taxing the finance sector using the fi-
nancial activities tax: the addition method and the subtraction method. Under the addition 
method, the tax base is the salary and profit of the financial institution. Under the subtraction 
method, income is subtracted the external “vare- og tjenesteinnsatsen”—a method that more 
closely resembles a value added tax. Primarily, the Norwegian focus has been on a tax of the 
second type. The final conclusion from the Ministry of Finance was to plan to undertake fur-
ther analysis of the structure and consequences of an activity tax.  
Due to the Ministry’s conclusion that the tax closely resembles a value added tax, it be-
came key to identify which structure of implementation could most closely mimic the charac-
teristics of the VAT. Among the issues the Ministry planned to evaluate further was how to 
avoid that businesses already subject to the VAT would be affected twice through the purchase 
of financial services. Because this tax would not be levied on individual transactions, it would 
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be more difficult for the business to deduct the tax when purchasing financial services; rather 
the tax would be applied cumulatively. This could affect production. The Crisis Commission 
further stated that the destination principle should be applied to avoid distortions based on 
the location of the taxpayer. As a result, for the Crisis Commission’s future analysis of this tax 
it is likely that the foregoing model would dominate that research. 
6.1.3 Financial Stability Contribution 
The “Financial Stability Contribution,” would be a tax levied on assets of financial in-
stitutions. This type of tax has been adopted in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
(European Commission Technical Fiche, 2011). The financial stability contribution is a balance 
sheet tax that would be based on the bank’s total liabilities minus equity, insured deposits, and 
insurance policyholder reserves. Most of the proceeds from the tax would go to a type of 
bailout fund, and thus the tax is akin to an insurance payment to fund future bailouts. Con-
sequently, the tax would only provide substantial revenues in times where profits of the finan-
cial industry significantly exceed those of the economy in general. As a result, economic rents 
in the financial sector will decline, and investors will move capital to other industries. In con-
trast to both the financial transaction tax and the financial activities tax, the Financial Stability 
Contribution is more focused on the value of the financial institution’s balance sheet, and is 
commonly referred to as a “bank levy.” Many argue that taxing individual transactions is less 
effective than the balance sheet tax. The main purpose of the financial stability contribution 
would be to support the fiscal expenditures used to support the financial industry. Moreover, 
commentators believe that taxing individual transactions is a less efficient way of curbing ex-
cess risk taking than the balance-sheet approach. Under the model analyzed by the IMF, the 
financial stability contribution would be a flat rate levied on all financial institutions, but then 
the rate would be revised to reflect the individual risk of each financial institution (Matheson, 
2011). The financial stability contribution would have two different components: a levy to 
reflect the fiscal costs used to support the financial sector and a smaller component to fund 
the availability of credit lines. The first component would raise revenue specifically targeted at 
future bailout costs, while the second component would go into general revenue. Although 
the primary purpose of the financial stability contribution is to cover the government costs of 
bailouts, the fee could be designed to have corrective effects on systemic risk as well by tying 
the rate into the structure of bank liabilities. This would happen by making the smaller com-
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ponent dependent factors that contribute to systemic risk, including size, leverage, and capital 
structure. Nevertheless, it is clear that the financial stability contribution would be a much 
smaller step than any of the other proposals. Moreover, the fee would be targeted towards a 
specific purpose, covering the costs of government bailouts, and would not raise as much rev-
enue as the other proposals. Consequently, the financial stability contribution would probably 
only be a partial solution to the issues the Commission tries to address with the financial 
transaction tax.  
However, the financial stability contribution is not without flaws. First, the financial 
stability contribution would increase the cost of financing. New investment tends to increase 
the value on the balance sheet, and because the tax would be imposed on the balance sheet of 
a financial institution, the financial institution would have to pay taxes of that additional capi-
tal. Second, because the tax is imposed on the size of the balance sheet it would not target 
risky assets in particular. Relatedly, because risky assets tend to have higher probabilities for 
large gains, the value of those assets may be lower on the balance sheet due to common use of 
historic values for assets in balance sheets. Moreover, because the tax would be imposed at a 
singular point in the year, most likely at the end, the tax would in fact penalize long-term in-
vestors. The investors that engage in more speculative activities tend to turn over portfolios 
and assets more frequently. Financial institutions may therefore choose to time the turnover 
so that the balance sheet is temporarily depressed at the time the tax is imposed. The financial 
institution may then choose to realize the gain, and distribute the proceeds to its investors. As 
such, there are many ways in which a financial institution would be able to avoid the financial 
stability contribution.  
6.1.4 Stamp Tax 
Another option that has been proposed as an alternative to the financial transaction tax 
is a stamp duty similar to the one imposed by the United Kingdom. Many view the stamp duty 
as a compromise between the introduction of the financial transaction tax and a laissez-faire 
approach. Moreover, the prospects of introducing an EU-wide stamp duty would be much 
higher than the financial transaction tax. Because the most prominent opponent of the finan-
cial transaction tax, the United Kingdom, already levies a stamp duty, the Commission could 
simply develop a proposal for a stamp duty based on the UK structure. In fact, Mark Hoban, 
 77 
the Financial Services Secretary for the United Kingdom, stated that Britain was “happy for 
member states to follow the stamp duty model if they chose to do so” (Barker, 2012). Similar-
ly, the German Federal Minister of Economics and Technology stated, “if the British aren’t 
willing to get closer to the European model of a financial transaction tax, it would make sense 
to talk with the British and other European states about the British model” (Pignal, 2012). 
Therefore, it seems that a stamp duty may be the easiest solution to implement, but would it 
accomplish the goals set forth by the European Commission? 
Indeed, many argue that the stamp duty is a superior model to the financial transaction 
tax. One major issue with the financial transaction tax is that it often targets market interme-
diaries, except for central clearinghouses, which are exempted under the proposal, rather than 
the market participants. In contrast, the stamp duty is levied on market participants, regardless 
of where the participant is located. Therefore, the stamp duty may be less susceptible to avoid-
ance because the current model applies to any purchase of UK shares regardless of where the 
party is located. The financial transaction tax would only apply to parties located within the 
European Union, which incentivizes avoidance through relocation. The financial transaction 
tax is levied on each party engaging in a transaction, and as a result, the total tax paid far ex-
ceeds the absolute amount per transaction. Furthermore, the stamp duty tax would not be 
susceptible to issues of equitable distribution because each country takes what takes place 
within their borders, regardless of where the original transaction is conducted. This, however, 
may be a double-edged sword. Because the stamp duty taxes the country where the equity is 
located, it may collect taxes from non-UK citizens. In fact, nearly 40 percent of UK stamp duty 
revenues come from abroad. It may be perceived as unfair, especially by the EU countries 
without significant financial centers of their own, that that country’s residents are paying sig-
nificant taxes to another country. The United Kingdom’s unwillingness to let go of revenues 
tied to activities in the City of London, is probably the primary reason why the United King-
dom accepts a stamp duty tax yet staunchly opposes a financial transaction tax.  
Nevertheless, the experiences so far with the stamp duty have not been uniformly posi-
tive. Several investment companies, including BlackRock, have expressed concerns that the 
stamp duty caused a shift from pure equity investment to equity derivatives that are exempt 
from the stamp duty (House of Lords, 2012, ¶ 12). Many investors also use Contracts for Dif-
ference, which allows the investors to avoid the tax but delays the realization of the gain. Con-
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sequently, it appears that if the stamp duty were to represent any realistic alternative to a fi-
nancial transaction tax, the stamp duty must be extended to derivatives as well. Moreover, 
currently nearly 70 percent of the total volume in UK stock markets is exempted from the 
stamp duty (Spratt, 2006). As a result, any European Commission action to introduce a stamp 
duty should be carefully re-crafted to avoid the loopholes that currently exist in the UK system. 
Moreover, the tax can be avoided by purchasing duplicate securities listed on foreign exchang-
es, such as American Depositary Receipts, instead of the UK security. Overall, it seems like the 
stamp duty has a great advantage in the higher likelihood of implementation, however, before 
such a proposal could be taken seriously there must be in-depth debate regarding the tax base, 
rates, and how to properly avoid the downfalls of the currently implemented stamp duties.  
6.2 Reforming Financial Regulation  
The European Commission should also consider stricter regulatory requirements to ad-
dress excessive risk taking and high frequency trading. In the wake of the financial crisis, many 
different strategies have been suggested for restructuring regulation of financial markets to 
ensure proper alignment of incentives between the financial sector and the economy at large. 
Notably, it appears that increased regulation is gaining notoriety, and that the financial crisis 
has significantly changed attitudes about the proper scope of government intervention. In fi-
nancial markets the most typical form of regulations pertain to the following areas: executive 
compensation, restrictions on ownership, disclosure of information, capital adequacy re-
quirements, and limits on investment activities. The need for market regulation arises from 
the fact that markets are not perfect, and inefficiencies develop for several reasons, including 
asymmetrical information that exists between market participants, transaction costs deter op-
timal behavior, and misalignment of incentives such as moral hazard.  
 One country that has significantly increased its level of regulation following the finan-
cial crisis is the United States. In the United States, the comprehensive Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) was enacted. Even though the Act 
had many vocal opponents, it gained traction with the general population as the wide-rippling 
effects of the financial crisis became known. The Dodd-Frank Act is the greatest overhaul of 
financial regulation in the United States since the Great Depression. The goal of the legisla-
tion as stated in the preamble is  
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[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ac-
countability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to 
fail,” to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes. 
The Act contains changes to the regulatory structure of the financial sector by creating several 
new agencies, either with completely new supervisory responsibility or taking over responsibili-
ties from an existing agency. Among these agencies are the financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil, the Office of Financial Research, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. These 
agencies are required to report to Congress on either an annual or biannual basis to update 
legislators on the progress of current plans and future goal setting. While the two latter agen-
cies are primarily focused on “monitoring systemic risk and researching the state of the econ-
omy and clarif[ying] the comprehensive supervision of bank holding companies by the Federal 
Reserve,” the Financial Stability Oversight Council focuses on identifying threats to financial 
stability of the United States, and responding to these threats. In the course of pursuing these 
goals, the council maintains several duties: (i) to enhance the integrity, efficiency, competitive-
ness, and stability of the United States financial markets, (ii) to promote market discipline, 
and (iii) to maintain investor confidence (U.S. Treasury, 2012, p. ii). The Act also aims to in-
crease oversight of the industry by increasing supervision of institutions that are perceived as 
creating systemic risk, and increasing reporting requirements. Additionally, the Act tries to 
create a “warning system” to enable regulators to predict when the economy is on the brink of 
a recession. Moreover, the Act imposes stricter restrictions on executive compensation, which 
would remedy the agency issues explained previously.  
Thus, the Commission should also look into potential changes to the regulatory struc-
ture. Currently, monitoring and regulation of the financial sector primarily takes place on a 
national level. The European Union could make a greater effort to increase regulation on an 
EU-wide basis. Alternatively, the European Union can encourage changes to the member 
states’ regulation. The specific regulatory measures could pertain to stricter disclosure re-
quirements or higher capital adequacy requirements. A higher requirement of capital or a 
minimum equity capitalization ratio would make financing more expensive for companies 
because equity is relatively more expensive than debt. However, if this regulatory change could 
reduce the risk of future crises, this cost will be partly offset by the lesser likelihood of fall in 
share prices as a result of a financial recession. Furthermore, currently many types of financial 
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transactions, including a large portion of OTC trading, takes place in the shadow of regulatory 
oversight. To more effectively combat systemic risk, regulatory authorities should expand the 
scope of monitoring so as to include these transactions as well. Additionally, by increasing the 
level of detail for required disclosure for each transaction, regulators may be able to single out 
market participants that consistently engage in transactions without economic substance, but 
merely exist for the purpose of “beating the system.” Although many parts of finance are 
viewed as “zero-sum games”—where one party to a transaction loses, while the other wins—the 
outcomes of these games should be determined based on fundamental analyses of market 
conditions, rather than strategic bets against the market. The key to aligning incentives be-
tween market participants will be to restore the focus to long-term, fundamental values. The 
goal should therefore be to encourage socially useful transactions that contribute to restoring 
prices towards equilibrium. Conversely, because high frequency trading generally disregards 
fundamental information, such trading will tend to destabilize prices and should be discour-
aged.  As such, regulators should ensure that computer-driven or algorithmic trading would 
not pay off as a long-term strategy. Moreover, regulations should be focused on maintaining 
proper capitalization of companies, including a healthy balance of debt-to-equity. This can be 
accomplished by implementing stricter capital adequacy requirements for financial institu-
tions. Similarly, current tax structures and mark-to-market arrangements encourage financial 
institutions to realize gains early and defer losses, which gives outside parties a skewed picture 
as to the true condition of the financial institution. Exactly which regulatory measures should 
be implemented to accomplish these goals is uncertain, however, it is undisputed that a tax on 
financial institutions alone will not accomplish the stated goals, but should be accompanied by 
proper regulatory measures.  	  
 
 81 
7. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the financial transaction tax shows significant potential for providing a 
one-step solution to several issues plaguing the European Union. The tax could serve several 
regulatory objectives while simultaneously raising revenues—two effects that are tremendously 
important for the current recovery from the financial crisis. Overall, the largest downfall of the 
financial transaction tax is that its public image significantly differs from its practical implica-
tions. While the public at large views the financial transaction tax as a “Robin Hood” replica 
that will ensure that the financial sector finally contributes its fair share to the economy, the 
practical implications of the tax may be that the tax instead affects “the poor” in the form of 
regular consumers and businesses. Although, the prospects of EU-wide implementation of a 
financial transaction tax in its current state are dim, this does not mean that the debate is like-
ly to die down anytime soon, especially in light of the fact that many citizens of European 
countries are struggling with the aftermath of the financial crisis, such as austerity measures. 
As described earlier, the Commission’s primary goals for the tax are to (1) raise revenue, 
(2) curb excessive volatility, and (3) harmonize the internal market. The most prominent ar-
gument in opposition to the financial transaction tax is that the tax inefficiently addresses 
multiple problems because of the broad scope of the tax. Although the financial tax will un-
doubtedly raise revenue and reduce national contributions to the EU budget, it is uncertain 
whether the overall effect after accounting for the negative externalities of the tax will be posi-
tive. The tax imposes a fee on the trade of financial instruments, and because trade in these 
assets will not cease completely, the tax will create revenue for the European Union. However, 
due to the cost of the tax, trading may decline, an effect that will directly impact the GDP of 
these countries. Moreover, in order to avoid the tax, taxpayers may relocate outside the Euro-
pean Union. This change in behavior will not only deprive the European Union member 
states of revenue from the financial transaction tax, but from other taxes and jobs as well. 
Therefore, governments should set the tax at a low rate to minimize the distortive effects of a 
financial transaction tax, and develop a structure for the tax that will minimize avoidance op-
portunities. Currently, the Commission proposal uses broadness in definitions to combat the 
risks of avoidance, which minimizes avoidance opportunities, but may also cause the tax to 
“aim too widely,” thereby affecting other parties such as consumers.  On the other hand, it is 
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unsettled whether the tax would actually contribute to reducing excess volatility. The underly-
ing rationale is to increase the cost of engaging in trading activities, and indirectly the cost of 
speculation, which is commonly perceived as a driving factor in creating market instability. A 
counterargument, however, is that the tax would actually increase the cost of engaging in risk-
reducing measures such as hedging. Moreover, high frequency trading is not exclusively nega-
tive. In fact, high frequency trading may facilitate liquidity in the market. If liquidity worsens 
in the market, the cost of capital may increase. Additionally, because the tax will increase 
transaction costs for investors, the tax will certainly contribute to increasing the cost of capital 
for companies. Furthermore, pervasive mispricing, insufficient allocation of risk, and misa-
ligned incentives, including executive compensation structures that essentially rewarded exces-
sive risk taking, were also significant causes of the crisis. Because the financial transaction tax 
only seeks to reduce the number of financial transactions, the tax would not remedy those 
issues. Finally, there is a legitimate argument for using the financial transaction tax to harmo-
nize the internal market. Currently, ten different European Union member states impose fi-
nancial transaction taxes, which could create issues of double taxation. Notably, the need for 
harmonization of the internal market is closely tied to the issue of global implementation. 
Many EU countries oppose the tax because tax because they argue that it will result in a com-
petitive disadvantage for European Union economies. If only a few countries impose the tax, 
companies may easily transact through another EU country via the open market. This in turn 
could create a competitive distortion in favor of the European Union member states that do 
not impose such a tax. Additionally, some argue in favor of the financial transaction tax due to 
its redistributive qualities. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, public outrage against the 
financial industry increased significantly. Many believed that greedy financial institutions 
whose sole concern was limited to the institution’s bottom line, was the driving cause behind 
the recent financial crisis which has plagued the world over the last few years. Therefore, a 
common argument in favor of the tax emphasizes that the tax would directly affect the finan-
cial industry, and would lead to a higher contribution from the financial sector to the rest of 
the economy. Moreover, the contribution would also be a form of repayment for previous 
bailout funds provided by governments, and could be akin to an insurance premium to cover 
future bailouts.  
Overall, it seems evident that, in its current state, the financial transaction tax has too 
many uncertainties, yet not enough confirmed benefits. Instead of using one tax to combat 
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many problems, legislators would be able to better address the various issues, with fewer dis-
tortions, by taking a multi-prong approach. Therefore, instead of passing the financial transac-
tion tax, authorities should evaluate a range of options. This could include a variety of 
measures, including a fiscal approach such as a variant of financial tax. However, this compre-
hensive approach should be more rooted in a regulatory framework, which could more aptly 
remedy the underlying distortions that exist in the market. To address the issue of excess vola-
tility, authorities should focus on stricter regulatory measures, including capital requirements, 
and closer monitoring of the risks borne by financial institutions. Additionally, regulatory 
authorities need to exercise broader oversight of the financial industry, and should follow the 
recent direction of countries such as the United States. Moreover, any regulatory measures 
should eliminate moral hazard issues, and focus on realigning the incentives of the financial 
industry with the economy at large. The fact that the spotlight is being directed toward the 
misalignment of incentives in the financial industry is important as it may finally force legisla-
tors to take steps to correct the fundamental misalignments in the industry because the public 
voice has finally become louder than that of the financial industry. For revenue-raising 
measures, other taxes, or increase of current taxes, could be considered. These taxes could 
have a regulatory effect as well, and could be a fiscal tool for realigning the incentives of the 
financial industry with the rest of the economy by imposing some of the costs of state guaran-
tees on the financial industry. One method for accomplishing this goal would be to imple-
ment a bank levy similar to the United Kingdom, and targeting the funds raised from a tax to 
a central bailout fund. The important consideration here would be to assess a tax that would 
have less of a negative effect on GDP than the financial transaction tax. One alternative would 
be to implement a financial activities tax, which has less of the negative effects of the financial 
transaction tax, but also possesses some of the risk-curbing qualities of the financial transac-
tion tax. Admittedly, for harmonization of the internal market, the enhanced cooperation 
framework that was recently authorized by the European Union will pose challenges for the 
open market. However, the most obvious solution to this problem would be to either disallow 
the enhanced cooperation framework, as a full implementation within the European Union is 
highly improbable. Consequently, authorities should consider alternative approaches for ad-
dressing the stated goals of the European Commission, even if that would create some dis-
harmony within the internal market.  
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APPENDIX 
 France Germany UK USA 
Name Tax on Banks 
(“Taxe systémique 
sur les banques”) 
Bankenabgabe 
(“Bank levy”) 
 
Bank Levy 
 
 
Financial Crisis 
Responsibility Fee 
 
Proposed start 
 
 
1 January 2011, 
based on figures of 
calendar year 2010. 
1 January 2011, but 
by reference to 
prior year balance 
sheets. 
1 January 2011 
 
 
Uncertain 
 
 
Expected duration 
 
Permanent 
 
Permanent 
 
Permanent 
 
10 years, or until 
TARP is repaid. 
Bank definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broad definition, 
which includes 
credit institutions, 
investment compa-
nies, market opera-
tors, members of a 
clearing house, 
payment institu-
tions, regulated 
financial companies 
and bank holding 
companies. 
s.1 of the German 
Banking Act, in-
cluding all credit 
institutes which 
have a permission 
according to s.32 of 
the German Bank-
ing Act. 
 
 
 
 
Banking groups, 
building societies; 
definition wide 
enough to include 
broker dealers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broad definition: 
bank holding com-
panies, insured 
depository institu-
tions, thrift holding 
companies, insur-
ance or other com-
panies that owned 
insured depository 
institutions, or 
securities bro-
ker/dealers. 
Local bank 
 
 
 
 
Local entities on a 
consolidated basis 
including subsidiary 
and foreign branch-
es. 
Local entities only 
(but may capture 
foreign branches of 
local entities). 
Levy based on glob-
al consolidated 
accounts for bank-
ing groups/building 
societies. 
Levy based on glob-
al consolidated 
accounts. 
 
 
Branches of foreign 
entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If regulated in 
France, except if the 
branch’s head-office 
is in the EEU (EU + 
Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein). 
 
 
Only if regulatory 
permission under 
s.32 of the German 
banking act (i.e. 
German activity 
only). 
 
 
Levy based on the 
UK attributed activ-
ity (aggregate all 
relevant the UK 
subsidiaries and 
branches), plus 
entities 
held/branches 
under the UK. 
If regulated in the 
US, but the fee is 
only levied on the 
US based liabilities. 
 
 
 
 
Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Progressive rates for 
“relevant liabilities”: 
≤ €10 bn = 0.02% > 
€10 bn ≤ €100 bn = 
0.03% > €100 bn = 
0.04% 0.00015% 
for off balance sheet 
derivatives. 
0.07% and 
0.0375% for longer 
maturity funding; 
lower rates 2011 
calendar year re-
scinded (for De-
cember 2011 year 
end, the effective 
rates are also 0.07% 
and 0.0375%) 
Not set, but ex-
pected to be 0.15% 
of “covered” liabili-
ties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of Proposed Financial Transaction Taxes. Source: KPMG, 2011. 
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Country 
Tax  
Revenue  
Tax Rate for Different Securities 
 (in billion $) 
Equity Bonds Options Futures Capital Levy 
Hong Kong $2.79 10 basis 
points 
    
India $1.22  Local stamp 
duties may 
apply 
0.017% on 
premium; 
0.125% on 
strike  
0.017% of 
delivery price 
 
South Korea $6.08 0.5% on 
value of 
shares in 
corporations 
or 
partnerships 
   0.1–0.4% tax 
on capital 
formation 
South Africa $1.41 0.25% of 
value; new 
share issues 
excluded 
    
Switzerland $2 15 basis 
points on 
domestic 
shares; 30 
basis points 
on foreign 
shares 
6–12 basis 
points on 
bond issuance 
  1% on share 
issuance in 
excess of 
CHF 1M 
Taiwan $3.3 30 basis 
points 
10 basis points 
on corporate 
bond principal 
10–60 basis 
points on 
premiums 
Up to 0.025 
bps on 
interest rate 
futures; up to 
6 basis points 
on 
 
United 
Kingdom 
$5.86 Stamp duty 
0.5% on 
secondary 
sales of 
shares and 
trusts 
holding 
share 
 50 bps on 
strike price, if 
executed 
50 bps on 
delivery 
price, if 
delivered 
 
Total $22.66      
Table 3. Source: Griffith-Jones & Persaud, 2012.6 
                                                
6.  Authors note that the data is drawn from IMF Working Paper Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence and 
World Bank GDP Data. Data is for 2009 for Hong Kong and Taiwan, 2008 for India, South Africa, and the United King-
dom, and 2007 for all other countries.  
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